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Summary 
 Individual autonomy refers to the process in which the individual shapes 
his life in a manner that is both authentic and independent. On the surface, these 
conditions of authenticity and independence seem to be at odds with the fact that 
we are social creatures since our ties and relationships with one another play 
fundamental roles in our wellbeing. The underlying aim of this thesis is to 
examine a part of, and contribute to, the ongoing discussion on how both 
individual autonomy and social ties constitute what it is to live a proper, 
acceptable, or good life. This thesis’ specific aim is to elucidate how individual 
autonomy can in fact be said to be social and to give an account of how 
socialization can undermine the individual’s autonomy while leaving the 
impression that autonomy is intact. 
  However, doubts about the coherence of speaking about autonomy and 
the social individual in the same breath arise for either of the following reasons. If 
the individual is socially determined, it is inevitable that part of his interests is 
bound with that of others. On top of that, the socially determined person’s self-
identity is partly constituted by his membership in social groups. All these 
objections are met when we see that they are based on several 
misunderstandings about what is entailed by the notion of autonomy. 
 Content-neutral theories of autonomy can be said to fall under three 
categories, hierarchical accounts, historical accounts, and competency accounts. 
I suggest that each of the three types of theories emphasize a different facet of 
the process of self-determination. Rather than consider them as competing 
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accounts, a fuller picture of what is involved in the exercise of autonomy emerges 
when we see them as complementary accounts. From this fuller account, we see 
several different aspects to autonomy- the person’s motivational structure, the 
capacities that constitute the exercise of autonomy, the translation of one’s 
autonomous commitments to real life, and one’s ongoing propensity for 
autonomy. These aspects of autonomy can be said to be social in three ways. 
Some are developed via socialization, the social environment can cause some to 
either flourish or atrophy, and some are socially constituted.  
 Autonomy is pertinent to the good life because we are creatures who 
apprehend the significance of particular notions and are hence moved by our 
recognition of their worth to shape our lives in accordance to these significant 
notions. Yet our recognition of the significance of these notions result from what 
we know and experienced. The accumulation of our experiences and information 
from the particulars of life is never complete until we die. Hence our 
understanding of each notion and what it entails is only abstract at any point in 
time and our commitment to it only general. An endorsement process that fails to 
take into account these abstract or general characteristics result in non-
autonomous action. Taking them into account means that the individual sees 
new experiences or information as sources of possible alternatives to his current 
recognition of his notions of significance. It is in inhibiting the ability to see new 
information as sources of alternatives or the ability to appropriate them that 
certain forms of socialization can undermine autonomy even though the 
individual endorses his actions and the motivations behind them.  
 1
Introduction   
 
 Individual autonomy refers to the process in which the individual shapes 
his life. The value that we attach to the individual’s prerogative to shape his life 
arises from the intuition that the exercise of this prerogative is not only essential 
to a person’s wellbeing but it is also part of what constitutes the good life. One 
would then expect that the claim, “individuals are social” will appear paradoxical 
to most people. But I suspect that we will have more difficulty in finding people 
who perceive the apparent paradox than those who need some explanation 
before they see why the claim might be problematic. Such a scenario will be 
indicative of two intuitions that most of us hold. On one hand we are individuals, 
separate from anyone or anything else and should be understood as such. On 
the other hand we are social because forming ties with others and relating to one 
another in various ways is part of our make-up. I believe both are not only 
intuitions of descriptive facts about us but they also rightly point to two factors 
that constitute a proper human life. The human being has been shown to be a 
social creature at the different levels of socialization. The individual’s political, 
communal, relational, familial, and personal facets have been expressed in the 
individual as part of country, tribe/ town/ community, group of friends, family and 
in the formation of intimate relationships. In fact Charles Taylor, in his essay 
“Atomism”, questions if certain human aspirations can develop outside of 
civilization, outside of “the development of art, philosophy, theology, science, of 
the evolving practices of politics and social organization.”1  
                                                 
1 Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical papers 2, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 204. 
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It is as important to acknowledge that humans are social together with the 
attending implications about our interdependence, our accountability, and 
responsibilities to each other, as it is to acknowledge that we are, also individuals. 
And overlooking the individual’s individuality in some ways can amount to 
robbing the individual of a part of his “human-ness”. It is this concern with 
elucidating what the individuality of individuals entails that the concept of 
individual autonomy2 is raised and discussed. It is the concern with correcting the 
unrealistic and undesirable emphases on human beings as self-sufficient and 
self-serving that has prompted the call to acknowledge the social aspect of our 
nature and steer and shape the discourse on autonomy accordingly. It is in 
response to this call that philosophers of relational autonomy have shown that 
the concept of autonomy is not inherently in conflict with the social person and 
social ties are not fetters from which free-spirited autonomous individuals must 
free themselves. Other philosophers have gone on to show that it is not coherent 
to speak of the autonomous individual without acknowledging our 
interdependence and interconnections.  
One way in which some philosophers have shown that it is coherent to 
speak of the autonomous and social self is to offer a procedural account of 
autonomy. They hold that ‘autonomy’ refers only to the process in which the 
individual authentically and independently endorses the motivations that lead him 
to act. Procedural theories make no constraints on the content of the individual’s 
                                                 
2 Henceforth in this thesis, all use of the word “autonomy” or any of its various forms (e.g. 
“autonomous”) refers to individual autonomy. References to specific types of autonomy like 




beliefs, attitudes, and commitments, thereby freeing the individual to possess or 
pursue any social or relational ends. According to Catriona Mackenzie and 
Natalie Stoljar in the introduction of their book Relational Autonomy3, three types 
of content-neutral procedural theories can be listed- hierarchical, historical, and 
competency accounts. Each one gives a different account of what the process of 
authentic and independent endorsement involves. Rather than taking them 
separately as competing accounts, I suggest that it will be more profitable to 
consider them as complementary. Part of chapter one will be focused on showing 
how each account emphasizes a facet of autonomy different from the other two, 
and when taken together the three accounts provide a better picture of what is 
involved in the exercise of autonomy. This picture will then provide us with a 
starting point for chapter two where the ways in which autonomy is social is 
examined. 
However, it has been pointed out that while it is true that most beliefs and 
relationships are compatible with autonomy, there remains a line beyond which it 
will be incoherent to consider the individual as autonomous. It is argued that 
individuals who hold the specific beliefs, attitudes, or commitments that are 
antithetical to autonomy cannot possibly be considered as autonomous and 
content-neutral procedural accounts do not offer sufficient conditions for 
determining if a person is autonomous. Hence, while autonomy does involve a 
process of endorsement, an adequate account of autonomy must be substantial 
in that it rules out anti-autonomy beliefs and commitments. For instance both 
                                                 
3 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured,” in Relational Autonomy, eds. 
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
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Paul Benson and Sigurdur Kristinsson hold that procedural accounts are 
insufficient and illustrate their claims by pointing out instances in which we will 
intuitively deem as non-autonomous the individuals who nevertheless satisfy 
procedural conditions of endorsement. Kristinsson argues that commitments to 
obey in all possible circumstances and regardless of any possible reasons there 
may be to act otherwise entail that the individual alienate himself from his own 
judgment and reason.4 He then shows that in order for an act to be deemed 
autonomous, it is necessary that the individual acts from his own goals and from 
judgment that is responsive to reasons. He concludes that conceptions of 
autonomy must be weakly substantive in that they must exclude commitments to 
obey regardless of any possible reasons that may bear on his commitment to 
obey, and in every possible circumstance. Similarly, Paul Benson argues that 
certain forms of oppressive socialization impede autonomy by limiting the 
individual’s ability to respond to relevant reasons. He holds that individuals who 
are under such socialization may endorse their acts in the manner laid out by 
procedural accounts but they cannot be considered autonomous because their 
ability to adjust their beliefs and commitments in response to relevant reasons 
has been impaired.5  
I believe that both Kristinsson and Benson are right to point out that 
autonomous persons must be responsive to relevant reasons. Kristinsson has 
also helpfully shown that this responsiveness to reason is borne by the fact that 
                                                 
4 Sigurdur Kristinsson, “The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive Account of 
Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2000): 257-286. 
 




the individual’s judgment has been engaged. This has shed much light on why 
responsiveness to reason is necessary in autonomy by highlighting that apart 
from the individual’s endorsement, it is also necessary that his judgment is 
engaged. It remains to be seen in what ways one’s judgment must be engaged in 
order for one’s act to be autonomous. One of the objectives of this thesis will be 
to explore this issue further. This condition regarding the engagement of the 
individual’s judgment has an inherent element of currency. I will attempt to show 
in chapter three why and how the person’s engagement of his judgment must be 
current in order for his acts to be considered autonomous.    
 The point of this thesis will be to show three things. 1) The three types of 
procedural accounts are not mutually exclusive but are complementary; together 
they present a more holistic picture of what individual autonomy involves. 2) I 
suggest that there are several aspects to autonomy; the individual’s motivational 
structure including his ends, specific capacities, translating one’s autonomous 
commitments into the shaping of one’s life, and the disposition to exercise 
autonomy- and discuss the ways in which each is social. 3) I attempt to show 
why and how the individual’s responsiveness to reasons must be current in order 
for his acts to be deemed autonomous. Recall that Benson claims that 
oppressive socialization operates by impairing the individual’s ability to respond 
to reasons. In line with Benson’s claim and in light of how some of the aspects of 
autonomy are social as discussed in chapter two, we will see the various ways in 
which such socialization impedes the currency of the individual’s responsiveness 
to reasons.  
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Linda Barclay sought to dissolve the apparent incompatibility between the 
concept of autonomy and the acknowledgement of the person as a social being 
in her paper, “Autonomy and the Social Self”6. In her paper, Barclay lists the 
ways in which individuals can be said to be social and shows how all of them are 
perfectly compatible with autonomy as long as the misunderstandings of what 
autonomy entails have been dispelled. I will begin by discussing Barclay’s paper 
in order to establish the coherence of speaking of autonomy in relation to the 
social individual. The second half of chapter one will be focused on showing how 
hierarchical, historical, and competency theories each emphasize a different 
facet of autonomy and when taken together, give us a fuller picture of what is 
involved in the exercise of autonomy. I suggest several aspects of autonomy can 
be seen in this fuller picture that emerges. An in-depth discussion of each aspect 
and the ways in which each is social will be put forth in the second chapter. 
Hopefully it will be shown by the end of chapter two that autonomy is socially 
developed, some of the processes involved in autonomy depend on a social 
environment to flourish, and the content of some of our autonomous 
commitments are social.  
Chapter three will look at one way in which our judgment must be 
engaged in autonomous acts. An account of a particular reason why an act may 
not be valid as an autonomous act will emerge from the discussion in chapter 
three. Since the validity of a process depends on whether it fulfils the function it is 
meant to fulfill, I begin by showing what the process of autonomy is meant to 
                                                 
6 Linda Barclay, “Autonomy and the Social Self,” in Relational Autonomy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 52-71. 
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fulfill. I do so while bearing in mind that autonomy is crucial for leading a proper 
human life because we are creatures who recognize the worth and significance 
of certain notions and are hence directed to live our lives in accordance with our 
recognition of their significance. The process of autonomy is meant to embody 
our bid to shape our lives in accordance with our notions of significance. I argue 
that our understandings of our notions of significance are abstract and the 
individual only gains a fuller understanding of his notions of significance when 
they are concretized in the relevant particular situations. I also argue that our 
commitments to these notions are general and each relevant situation presents 
the individual with the opportunity to affirm or reject his recognition of their 
significance. Hence a process that leads to an autonomous act is one that takes 
into account and reflects the abstract and general nature of the individual’s 
apprehension of his notions of significance. The way in which the process 
reflects this is in the fact that the individual does not consider his recognition of 
his notions of significance as having been “settled once and for all”. Instead, he 
takes into consideration the new information that he has encountered and 
responds accordingly with regards to his recognition of the notions as significant. 
This is not to say that the autonomous individual can never embrace notions of 
significance and ideals in any meaningful sense since it seems that he must only 
commit to them tentatively. The kind of tentativeness I argue for is only of the sort 
that results from being open to revisit, evaluate, and adjust one’s beliefs in light 
of new information that one encounters. It is of the sort that is inherent in any 
commitment that is not “dead” and has no bearing on the person’s life. At the end 
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of the thesis, I will look at the possible reasons why the individual may be 
prevented from responding to reasons and end by spelling out the relevance of 
the conclusions in this thesis to some of the claims made by Benson and 
Kristinsson in their papers. 
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Chapter 1: Relational Autonomy 
  The concept of individual autonomy captures the central idea of self-
determination. A useful conception of autonomy must adequately account for the 
intuitions we have about it and be consistent with a realistic notion of the person. 
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar introduce “relational autonomy” as “an 
umbrella term, designating a range of related perspectives…premised on a 
shared conviction, the conviction that persons are socially embedded and that 
agents’ identities are formed within the context of social relationships and shaped 
by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, gender, 
and ethnicity. Thus the focus of relational approaches is to analyze the 
implications of the intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood and identity 
for conceptions of individual autonomy and moral and political agency.”7 
Proponents of relational autonomy point out that non-relational conceptions of 
autonomy rely on the inaccurate assumptions that human beings are ultimately 1) 
individualistic in their ends or 2) atomistic, in the sense of being self-sufficient 
and independent, in their make-up.  
1) Individuals are social and not individualistic in their pursuits. Individuals do 
not seek only their self-interest but the interests of significant others are 
often bound up with their own interests. This is true in intimate 
relationships such as those among family members and close friends with 
whom we share our lives, whose welfare are indistinguishably bound up 
with ours. This means that useful accounts of autonomy must not preclude 
                                                 
7 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured”, 4.  
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the possibility of individuals freely choosing to subordinate their self-
interest to someone else’s benefit.  
Furthermore, individuals are social in the sense that part of their identities 
are social in nature; people understand their membership in particular 
groups as forming part of who they are. For instance individuals may 
understand themselves to be a child of so and so, who is of a specific 
ethnicity, a specific nationality, a member of particular interest groups, an 
alumni of specific schools, and so on.  
Conceptions of autonomy that ignore how individuals’ self-
understanding is social are simply unrealistic and ignore the fact that the 
wellbeing of individuals can be intertwined with the interests of the group 
to which he belongs. It can also be said that the self interests of 
individuals who understand themselves at least partly in terms of their 
membership of a community can be partly indistinguishable from the 
interests of the community in the areas of their lives that are bound up with 
the community. Hence robust conceptions of autonomy and individual 
interest must make room for individuals’ subordination of their interests to 
that of another or a group. It is not denied that the individual’s social 
commitments can be detrimental to his autonomy, in fact, it is precisely 
part of the task of relational formulations of autonomy to give an account 
of autonomy that can help differentiate between social arrangements that 
are harmful to the individual’s autonomy while taking into account the 
ways in which individuals are relational.  
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2)  We are not atomistic. We are not self-sufficient and independent 
individuals who come completely equipped with all the capacities that are 
necessary for autonomy and a full life. The capacities that are employed in 
the exercise of autonomy such as evaluative skills, communication skills, 
and self-awareness, are developed in socialization. Individuals were 
recipients of care and nurture by other persons and could only develop 
competence in the capacities if they have been encouraged in them. 
Besides, the medium of thought and reflection, language8 itself, is socially 
constructed and shared. In fact it has been an issue of great interest to 
find out if thought itself is possible without language. Autonomy is not 
atomistic because the capacities that are necessary for it can only be 
developed in community. It is also not atomistic because some of the 
capacities involved are exercised in community with others- capacities 
such as self-awareness, deliberation, and apprehension of alternatives. 
Thus accounts of autonomy that take into consideration the social aspects 
of human beings should not lead to a normative claim that implies an 
extraction of the individual from community in such a way that is self-
defeating. 
Relational conceptions of autonomy are useful in locating the right 
conceptual point between the belief that we are social in some fundamental ways 
and the intuition that individual self-determination is somehow constitutive of 
what it means to lead a full human life. But this is assuming that the 
                                                 
8 Of course “language” here refers to much more than the usual spoken or written medium we 
use like English and Mandarin. 
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acknowledgment that we are socially constituted does not mean that autonomy is 
nothing but an illusion. The claim that the individual’s motivational structures 
(values, beliefs, attitudes, and desires) and his cognitive processes (evaluation, 
deliberation, judgment, imagination) are socially constituted in some ways does 
not mean that he is nothing but the sum of all the social forces working on them. 
And the concept of autonomy does not necessarily commit us to an individualistic 
and atomistic notion of the individual. In “Autonomy and the Social Self”, Linda 
Barclay discusses how the apparent contradiction between autonomy and the 
notion of the self as a social being is based on a misunderstanding of the notion 
of autonomy.9 Barclay’s essay is especially useful because it not only highlights 
the implications that autonomy has been misunderstood to have, it also provides 
an outline of how individuals can be said to be social. 
This chapter will begin with a defence of the compatibility between 
autonomy and the understanding of the individual as a social being by discussing 
Linda Barclay’s essay “Autonomy and the Social Self”. This will be followed by an 
explanation of why I have chosen to examine the social dimensions of autonomy 
in terms of the various aspects that are involved in it rather than to rely only on 
the hierarchical, or historical, or competency account of autonomy. It will end with 
a brief look at the difference between autonomy in its global sense and autonomy 
in its occurrent sense. The social dimensions of each aspect of autonomy are 
discussed in chapter two. A specific way that socialization can compromise 
autonomy will be examined closely in the third chapter. 
 
                                                 
9 Barclay, op. cit., 52-71. 
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Linda Barclay’s “Autonomy and the Social Self” 
Linda Barclay describes several ways in which the self10 may be said to 
be social- the individual may be i) socially determined, ii) motivationally social, or 
iii) constitutively social- and explains how each is in fact compatible with 
autonomy. 
i) Barclay first deals with the objection that because individuals are shaped 
entirely by their socialization, all the choices they make are “as much a product of 
the social environment as (their) pre-reflective ends and purposes are”.11 
According to this objection, autonomy is nothing more than an illusion since 
everything that leads up to the individual’s acts are attributable to external 
sources.  
First, Barclay deals with i) the objection that because we are socially 
determined, we cannot be said to be autonomous. She argues that such views 
are based on the misunderstanding that autonomous agency entails acts that are 
completely free of causes, and that a person is only autonomous if he 
“mysteriously escapes altogether from social influence”.12 But, Barclay points out, 
the concept of autonomy is compatible with the fact that individuals are 
influenced by the social forces around them because autonomy simply implies 
that the autonomous person “is not a passive receptacle of these forces but 
                                                 
10 I use the term ‘self’ and ‘individual’ interchangeably here even though the concepts can be 
quite distinct. The term ‘self’ connotes a first person perspective as in ‘self worth’ and ‘self 
concept’ and may carry with it implications about self interpretation or self report, whereas 
‘individual’ connotes being separate from others. But this distinction is not relevant for the 
purpose of this chapter since both senses are applicable here.    




reflectively engages with them to participate in shaping a life for herself”.13 
However, autonomy captures the idea of self-determination and calls for the 
individual to shape his own life in a manner that is authentic and independent. So 
Barclay’s response can seem inadequate if we consider that authenticity seems 
to be a myth for the individual whose every move has been influenced by 
external forces. Barclay’s rejoinder is that this objection that a person is 
inauthentic if he has been influenced by others is based on the false premise that 
authenticity “(refers) to the hidden inner self, which (sic) is finally revealed after 
the effects of socialization have been stripped away”. Instead, the authentic self 
simply refers to the self that is continually constructed as the individual evaluates, 
endorses or rejects, and appropriates the various inputs from around him.14  
A possible reply to Barclay’s rejoinder is that this notion of authenticity 
does not really address the issue because even the processes by which the 
authentic self is shaped and re-shaped are themselves products of prior social 
forces. However, two things can be said in response: a) the reply is based on the 
particular assumption that the authentic individual is one who succeeds in being 
unresponsive to all external influences. But in order for such an assumption to be 
satisfactory, there must also be a coherent account in which the self that does 
not identify with anything that is deemed external to himself still retains an 
adequately full self-identity. Besides, even if there can be a radically 
individualistic and atomistic self-identity, it is unclear whether such a scanty self-
identity provides a sufficiently “thick” background that is assumed in the notion of 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 55. 
14 Ibid., 54. 
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autonomy, understood as shaping one’s life based on one’s commitments and 
values and our significant commitments. This rings especially true when we 
consider that values are precisely the things that we first recognize as external in 
the sense of being about “more than myself”15. We see that autonomy cannot 
consist of authenticity in the radical sense of being impervious to external 
influences when we see that the person for whom autonomy is pertinent is the 
person who apprehends notions of significance that he recognizes to have 
personal relevance for his life. Furthermore, the significance of these notions is 
recognized as deriving from beyond the individual. Upon apprehending the 
significance of these notions, the individual is in a way committed to shape his 
life in light of them. b) This objection can also be read as paralleling the claim of 
metaphysical determinism- that the individual just is the product of all the forces 
that act on him. But as Mackenzie and Stoljar have pointed out, issues about the 
metaphysical make-up of human beings are irrelevant to autonomy but are 
“separate from and perhaps prior to the question of the nature of the person’s 
characteristics and capacities, including her autonomy.”16 The possibility of 
authentic and independent participation in the shaping of one’s life is a separate 
issue from whether one acts from an identity that is entirely a product of external 
influences. Consider the assumption that the identity of the individual is indeed 
completely the product of external forces. It will still be coherent to speak of the 
possibility of authentic and independent participation in shaping his life in 
                                                 
15 Charles Taylor discusses how an insistence on the value of authenticity is meaningful only 
against a background of having a notion of there being significance beyond the self, what he 
terms as “horizons of significance”. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992)  
16 Mackenzie and Stoljar, “Autonomy Refigured”, 8. 
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accordance with what is important to him. Even if the identity that underlies his 
actions is a product of external forces, it is nevertheless his identity. And we can 
still speak of him as being distinct from other individuals, from any group, from 
any process or influence. He is, after all, still individuated by an identity that is a 
unique confluence of all the external influences that have worked on him. To say 
that he is autonomous just means that the shape his life takes proceeds from 
who he is, as embodied in his identity. It also entails that it is not another human 
being, or group, who determines how he should live. Again, it can be reiterated 
that autonomy does not entail a self that is self-constructed ex nihilo, including in 
the metaphysical sense. 
 Objection ii) raises the issue of whether motivationally social persons can 
be autonomous. Autonomy may be incompatible with the social self because its 
call to take a critically reflective stance towards everything can be construed as 
being in conflict with the fact that we are sometimes socially motivated. Those 
who hold such a view believe that autonomy as a value presupposes that the 
individual is primarily self-interested or should be self-interested, and is 
independent and self-sufficient. It then appears that autonomy carries with it the 
implications that social relationships are ultimately nothing more than means to 
fulfilling our self interests and the individual can easily detach himself from 
relationships of care. This implication is then contrasted with the motivationally 
social individual who is not always motivated by self-interested reasons, who is 
often motivated by the interests of the people with whom he has relationships of 
care and concern, who in fact, it can find it extremely difficult to detach 
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themselves from such relationships. Furthermore, those who hold that the 
motivationally social self is incompatible with autonomy sometimes also claim 
that autonomy should not even be encouraged. They hold that being in 
relationships is something that is necessary to the welfare of the relational being 
and autonomy’s requirement of constant ratiocination is not conducive to the 
maintenance of relational ties. On top of that, there are particular types of 
relationships that are fundamental to the welfare of individuals. For instance, it is 
apparent that the nurturing provided by mothers or the sense of security provided 
by fathers are essential to the development of a well-adjusted person. It is then 
said that such relationships must be protected from the possible destructive 
effects that the ratiocinating stance thought to be required for autonomy may 
carry. 
In response, Barclay points out that autonomy does not oblige the 
individual to alienate himself from all social ties or to pursue only his own 
interests. Theories of autonomy that are procedural are content-neutral and are 
only concerned with how the individual comes to identify with the motivations or 
the relationships. Some procedural theories also take into account how the 
individual acquires his motivations or the commitments to his relationships. 
Procedural theories of autonomy do accommodate relationships that involve 
putting the interests of others above that of one’s own, or in which the interests of 
the other constitutes part of one’s own interest, for instance in parent-child 
relationships or husband-wife relationships. Such theories consider the individual 
autonomous even if he holds values and beliefs that involve subordinating his 
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own interests to that of another as long as these values and beliefs have been 
subject to the appropriate critical reflection or have been acquired in the 
appropriate manner.  
Barclay also indicates that the perceived incompatibility between 
autonomy and the socially motivated self is due to the assumption that autonomy 
requires the individual to step away from and critically reflect on all his 
commitments at the same time.  But critical reflection is done in a piecemeal 
manner, placing some relevant issues in the spotlight while holding the other 
parts of one’s identity and their attending commitments in place. Procedural 
theories of autonomy only lay out conditions that are related to the process of 
critical reflection, and authentic and independent endorsement. Such theories do 
not dictate that individuals can only have specific relationships or that the content 
of our motivational structures must be of specific kinds in order to be considered 
autonomous. Hence adopting procedural theories of autonomy does not commit 
one to be individualistic in one’s commitments or motivations.  
I would like to add that even substantive theories of autonomy such as 
those propounded by Paul Benson17, Sarah Buss18, Sigurdur Kristinsson19 and 
Marina Oshana20 do not entail that autonomous persons must be individualistic 
in their pursuits. These theories seek to elucidate the perimeter of commitments 
within which it is coherent to speak of autonomy and relationships that are 
                                                 
17 Paul Benson, “Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility,” in 
Relational Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 72-93. 
18 Sarah Buss, “Autonomy Reconsidered,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 95-121.    
19 Kristinsson, Op.Cit. 




commonly intuited to be worth protecting often fall within the suggested 
perimeters. Besides, most substantive theories spell out very specific criteria for 
what does not fall within the perimeters rather than what does fall within it (and 
are hence much more inclusive than exclusive) with the result that only a small 
number of particular types of relationships are deemed to be incompatible with 
autonomy.      
While acknowledging that critical reflection may sometimes lead people to 
end certain relationships, Barclay says that this may not always be a bad thing 
since some relationships are actually destructive, citing relationships of chronic 
abuse or exploitation as examples.21 However, even the possibility that critical 
reflection may lead to the severance of some relationships that are in fact worthy 
of having does not give us reason to reject the value of autonomy altogether 
since we should not “disparage the worth of a certain capacity (in this case, 
autonomy) because it is sometimes exercised in a bad way.”22 But of course this 
is assuming that autonomy is of more than instrumental value. It is not part of the 
concern of this thesis to examine in depth the value of autonomy, but following 
Charles Taylor23, I suggest that autonomy is valuable not just as a means to 
some valuable end, but also because it is constitutive of what it means to lead an 
                                                 
21 Barclay, Op. Cit., 60. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Taylor, “Atomism.” Taylor points out that to accord primacy to rights claims is to assume that 
human beings are atomistic. However, Taylor notes, to assert individual rights is to affirm the 
value of the human capacities that these rights are meant to protect. Furthermore, if atomism is 
wrong and human beings need to belong to communities in order to develop those capacities of 
value, then to assert individual rights is to oblige oneself to belong to a community and to 
advance the development of communities that are necessary for developing those capacities. In 
particular, Taylor points out throughout the essay that we ascribe certain rights to human beings 
such as the “right to life, to freedom, to the unmolested profession of their own convictions, to the 
exercise of their moral or religious beliefs”, precisely because they protect particular human 
capacities (like autonomy) that we consider worthy of respect, and without which we would only 
have a very truncated sort of life. 
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acceptably full human life of any worth. In addition to Barclay’s point, I would like 
to point out that it is precisely in relationships that we hold dear- for instance 
romantic love between spouses, familial love, relationships of respect and 
admiration, relationships of charity between benefactor and beneficiary- that 
autonomous involvement is essential. Authentic and independent commitment to 
and identification with the other in the relationship are inherent in relationships of 
love, respect, admiration, or charity. A programmed robot or hypnotized person 
cannot have such relationships because he cannot exercise the authentic, 
independent willingness that constitutes these types of relationships. The fact is 
people cannot be coerced to love, respect, admire or pity. It is true then that 
relationships involving these notions are in contradiction with the cold, hard, 
calculative self-interest that autonomy is thought to imply. But as Barclay points 
out, theories of autonomy need not necessarily presuppose that human beings 
are fundamentally self-interested in our motivations or presume that we should 
be self-interested in our motivations. 
Finally, Barclay addresses iii), the objection that the constitutively social 
self is not compatible with autonomy. It has been pointed out that our self identity 
is social, that who we are is constituted by our memberships in certain 
communities. Hence when an individual critically reflects, he does so as one who 
is embedded in certain social groups with a point of view that is constructed with 
socially shared norms and ways of looking at things. Moreover, we do not choose 
our ends but “discover” them as socially shared ends. Hence autonomy is 
 
 21
incompatible with the constitutively social self because autonomy presupposes 
that the individual can extract himself from his communal ties in critical reflection.  
However, Barclay questions the assumptions that because we understand 
ourselves in terms of our membership in specific groups, and rely on socially 
derived or shared values and ends in our critical reflection, we cannot subject 
these ends and values to critical reflection. She points out that we can subject 
even our socially acquired ends, values, and ways of looking at things to critical 
reflection because we do not have to reflect on all of them at once. We reflect on 
some elements of our motivational structure while holding the others in place. 
Besides, it is a matter of fact that people do critically reflect on and sometimes 
reject their socially shared ends and values. We need only to draw attention to 
the fact that social deviants are not uncommon in societies to see that this is true.  
Adding to Barclay’s argument, it is also helpful to point out that this 
objection relies on the false assumption that one’s identification with a community 
is an all-or-nothing affair. Even members of the same community do not embrace 
and reject the same things in their community. Members often identify selectively 
with parts of the body of values, beliefs, norms, and ends that are found in or 
endorsed by their community. Members often identify with different elements 
from other members or have slightly different interpretations of the socially 
shared values or beliefs. On top of that, the answers to the question of how we 
should even go about characterizing the differences and similarities in values, 
beliefs, norms, and ends that do and can  occur within a community, is far from 
unanimous.      
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Barclay also addresses the normative claim that because individuals are 
socially constituted, “agency which proceeds via the discovery of constitutive 
ends is more valuable, deeper, than autonomous agency”.24 She argues against 
such claims by pointing out that they are not necessarily true. There are 
instances when individuals embrace socially shared values and ends to their own 
detriment. We can see this in women who persist in oppressive relationships that 
are endorsed by their communities. In fact, the claim that socially shared ends 
are more valuable simply begs the question: Socially shared ends cannot be said 
to be more valuable simply because they are socially shared. I would like to add 
that the prescriptive force of moral values presumes more than ‘robotic’ or 
‘programmed’ assent. Part of what it means to subject oneself to a moral law is to 
autonomously subject oneself to it, identifying with it and taking it for oneself. Just 
as an individual who has been brain washed to commit evil acts cannot be held 
culpable, the individual whose righteous acts are not autonomous cannot be 
praised for those acts. Even socially shared values must presuppose 
autonomous assent on the part of the individual if they are to have prescriptive 
force for the individual as values rather than as something forced upon him. 
Upon “discovering” certain socially shared values, the individual still has to think 
of them as worthy of being subjected to before it can be said that these values 
have moral prescriptive power for him. They do not have moral prescriptivity qua 
moral prescriptivity for the individual if he does not embrace them for himself.25 
                                                 
24 Barclay, op. cit., 63. 
25 This does not mean that a moral value is only valid when an individual endorses it, the claim 
here is that the demands of morality necessarily includes autonomous assent on the part of the 
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He may still feel compelled to act in accordance to the values but only because 
of other reasons such as fear of being ostracized, or of inconvenience, or of 
losing the approval of his peers, and so on. 
Looking at autonomy holistically 
 Whenever one encounters a discussion of individual autonomy, one can 
expect the qualification that even though it is a concept that is often implied or 
referred to, it is also one that is difficult to “nail down” in terms of more concrete 
formulations. Questions concerning the actual conceptualization of autonomy 
itself such as, “What is it to exercise autonomy?” or “How do we know whether a 
person is autonomous?” are as resistant to straightforward answers as questions 
that relate to the place autonomy should have in our lives such as, “Why is 
autonomy so important in the first place?”, “To what extent should we encourage 
or develop autonomy?”. Arguably, it is precisely because autonomy does not 
lend itself easily to any particular comprehensive yet satisfying formulation that 
gives the notion its usefulness in such an expansive range of issues as the bases 
for having a government, political or legal rights, universal human rights, liberty, 
and justice. Gerald Dworkin sums it up well when he wrote, “There is also a 
tendency to use the concept in a very broad fashion. It is sometimes used as an 
equivalent to liberty, sometimes as equivalent to freedom of the will, sometimes 
identified with rationality or sovereignty. It is applied to very different entities: to 
acts, to persons, to the will, to desires, to principles, to thoughts. My own view is 
that as a term of art, one cannot look to the ordinary uses of the concept. What a 
                                                                                                                                                 
individual. The individual cannot be said to identify with the value as an ethical value unless he 
has autonomously subjected himself to it. 
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theorist must do is construct a concept- given various theoretical purposes and 
some constraints from normal usage. But the construction of the concept must be 
relative to a set of problems and questions.”26  
Dworkin is right in pointing out that the notion of autonomy can only be 
usefully employed when it is given a specific formulation with an eye to a 
particular set of issues to which it is meant to apply. This does not mean that we 
must resign ourselves to a situation where there really can be as many valid, 
though mutually incompatible, formulations of autonomy as there are reasons to 
refer to the concept, where it becomes incoherent to use the single term 
“autonomy” for all of them. What it does mean is that there are a number of 
different aspects of autonomy that are irreducible to one another and the different 
issues require an examination of the different aspects of autonomy. For instance, 
someone who wishes to suggest a specific schedule of human rights based on 
the right to autonomy will have to look closely at why autonomy is valuable in the 
first place, and the ways in which autonomy may be violated by external forces. 
On the other hand, questions about justice in specific social economic or political 
arrangements may hinge on a theory about the necessary conditions for the 
development or flourishing of autonomy. For my purpose of looking at the various 
ways in which autonomy is social, it is necessary not to focus only on one aspect 
of autonomy but to examine each of its various facets. 
 In the next chapter, I will look at the ways in which autonomy is social by 
examining the different aspects of autonomy; the motivational structures27, 
                                                 
26 Gerald Dworkin, “Autonomy,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. 
Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, (UK, Oxford University Press, 1993), 359.  
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ends28, capacities that are employed in the exercise of autonomy, the actual 
assertion of one’s autonomous commitments as one shapes one’s life in the 
world, and the continued propensity to exercise autonomy. It is useful to examine 
autonomy in its various aspects for the purpose of looking at how it is social. The 
reason for this is that there are different aspects of autonomy that are irreducible 
to a single notion and the relevance of the social self on each aspect is different. 
And it is only by looking at each aspect individually that we can have a sense of 
the full implications that the social self has on the concept of autonomy. Each of 
the aspects that will be examined is implied in one or more of the various types of 
procedural accounts of autonomy discussed below. One may object to combining 
the various aspects of autonomy that have been implied in what was meant to be 
different and competing accounts of autonomy as if they are all part of a singular 
account. But I do not think that this is an issue because these are neither 
conflicting nor mutually exclusive, but are complementary accounts that 
emphasize on different parts of the process of autonomy. Catriona Mackenzie 
and Natalie Stoljar list three types of procedural theories of autonomy- 
hierarchical, historical, and competency theories. Each type of theory gives a 
different account of what autonomous endorsement entails. What follows is a 
discussion of each type of account and my attempt at showing how together they 
actually give a holistic picture of autonomy.29 But I would first like to briefly 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 ‘Motivational structures’ refer to the individual’s beliefs (‘what is’), values (‘what ought to be’), 
attitudes (‘how I feel about it’), and desires (‘what I want’). 
28 ‘Ends’ refer to what the individual holds as good- his ideals, goals, and what he holds dear.  
29 Such a claim was not made by Mackenzie and Stoljar in the essay from which I cite. 
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comment on why I am not looking at substantive theories and have chosen 
instead to focus only on content-neutral theories. 
 Unlike content-neutral theories, substantive theories of autonomy include 
specific criteria on the nature of the content of the individual’s motivational 
structure or commitments. Proponents of substantive theories do not deny that 
the procedural criteria set out by one or another content-neutral theorist is 
necessary. However, they do not think that content-neutral theories sufficiently 
account for our intuitions about when a person can be thought of as autonomous. 
But this disagreement between content-neutral and substantive theorists about 
the sufficiency of procedural criteria does not pose any problems for my purpose 
here. This is because the content-neutral accounts here that emphasize the 
process involved in the exercise of autonomy are not denied by substantive 
theorists. Substantive theorists seek to improve on them by adding substantive 
conditions to their content-neutral conditions. Thus the conclusions in the 
following section can also be acceptable to substantive theorists.  
It can be objected that if substantive theories illuminate aspects of 
autonomy that these content-neutral ones do not, leaving them out of my 
investigation below will lead to an incomplete picture of what is involved in 
autonomy. This may be true, but I believe that any additional substantive 
conditions, if there is indeed a need for them, arise in virtue of the fact that 
certain types of beliefs or commitments interfere with the process of exercising 
autonomy. Hence, substantive theories must be seen as extensions of, rather 
than mutually exclusive with, content-neutral theories. So the following account 
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based on content-neutral theories is still necessary as a “foundation” for 
postulating any substantive conditions and any additional aspect that may arise 
from substantive theories will still be compatible with the conclusions which 
emerge from the following account. 
 Hierarchical accounts of autonomy are concerned about whether the 
individual has endorsed30 the values, beliefs, attitudes, and desires that are 
occurrently at work in his choice. Hierarchical accounts posit that there is a 
structure to the will of human beings that consists of different levels of 
identification, and endorsement involves the identification of motivations that are 
at a lower level with that of motivations that are at the higher level. Harry 
Frankfurt presents such an account in his essay “Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person”31. Frankfurt states that persons have preferences 
regarding what it is that moves them to act. The desires that bear upon our wills 
are what Frankfurt calls ‘first order desires’. He terms as “effective first order 
desires” the first order desires that end up moving our wills to act. Frankfurt notes 
that we also have preferences regarding our effective first order desires (we may 
“want to want” something or “not want to want” it) and he calls these preferences 
‘second order volitions’. Second order volitions are the individual’s preferences 
                                                 
30 In her paper “Autonomy Reconsidered”, Sarah Buss argues that contrary to the numerous 
procedural accounts, endorsement is irrelevant to autonomy. But I think that Buss’ argument rests 
on a misunderstanding of what endorsement entails in theories like Frankfurt’s. Buss holds that 
according to accounts like Frankfurt’s, when the individual endorses an act, she must also prefer 
it to all other alternative actions. And Buss goes on to show how a person may autonomously 
take a certain course of action even though she would prefer not to do it. But it is not implied in 
accounts like Frankfurt’s that the individual prefers the endorsed act over all other alternatives, 
only that she identifies with it. Sarah Buss, “Autonomy Reconsidered.” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 19 (1994): 95-121. 
31 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Inner Citadel, ed. 
John Christman, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 63-76.  
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regarding what it is that “moves his will”. A person has ‘freedom of the will’ only 
when his effective first order desires are in line with his second order volitions, 
meaning that he approves of what it is that moves his will.  
A person’s motivational structure is constituted by the things that move his 
will so we can say that the individual’s occurrent motivational structure parallels 
what Frankfurt calls “first order desires”. Even though Frankfurt focuses mainly 
on what a person wants on the level of first order desires, what he says can also 
be applied to the other elements of the motivational structure, such as values, 
attitudes, and beliefs. This is so because in characterizing the person with a 
second order volition, Frankfurt states that such a person “wants the desire to X 
to be the desire that moves him effectively to act…He wants this desire to be 
effective - that is, to provide the motive in what he actually does.”32 The point for 
Frankfurt is that the motivations that move the person to act (on the first level) 
must be those that he wants as his motivation to act (second order volition). 
Values, attitudes, and beliefs are as potent in compelling individuals to act as 
desires are. But if one is uncomfortable saying that values, attitudes, and beliefs 
direct the individual in the same way that desires do, we can also say that values, 
attitudes, and beliefs collude with one’s desires to motivate one to act. The 
bottom line is that for Frankfurt, what matters is that the motivations on the first 
level are in line with the second order volitions. Henceforth, instead of using the 
specific term “first order desires” I will refer to it generally as “first order 
motivation”.  
                                                 
32 Ibid., 66. 
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 Two main objections have been raised with regard to hierarchical 
accounts. First, that without any additional conditions, such accounts lead 
inevitably to an infinite regression since the values, beliefs, attitudes and desires 
that are involved in endorsing first order motivation must themselves have been 
endorsed at a higher level. Second, there is the question as to why second order 
volitions should be privileged over first order motivation by being thought of as 
more representative of a person’s authentic self even though first order 
motivations also belong to the individual. An account such as Frankfurt’s needs 
to give reasons for why first order desires do not belong to the person or 
represent his true self in the same way that the second order volitions do.  
These two objections can be met by showing that second order volitions 
are of a different type from first order motivations which do not require 
endorsement at a higher level and must be privileged over first order desires. 
Here, Charles Taylor’s notion of “strong evaluation”33 is extremely helpful in 
illuminating the difference between first order motivations and second order 
volitions in a way that is relevant to autonomy.  
Taylor distinguishes between weak evaluations and strong evaluations. 
Both weak evaluations and strong evaluations may be evaluations about first 
order desires. But while in weak evaluations, if “one desired alternative is set 
aside, it is only on grounds of its contingent incompatibility with a more desired 
alternative”34, strong evaluations involve a judgment as to the worth of the 
alternatives. In weak evaluations, the different alternatives are not compatible 
                                                 
33 Charles Taylor, “What is Human Agency?” in Human Agency and Language, Philosophical 
papers 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15-44. 
34 Ibid., 19. 
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because circumstances happen to make them so, and one desire is preferred 
over another because the desire for it is stronger. In strong evaluations, we 
characterize the alternatives in necessarily contrastive qualitative terms. For 
instance, we may find ourselves in situations where we must choose between 
alternative actions that are either “courageous or cowardly”, “kind or malevolent”, 
“sublime or base”, “magnanimous or petty”, “pure or corrupt”. Strong evaluations 
have to do with questions as how we want to lead our lives, who we want to be, 
and what is significant to us. And it is precisely with regards to the issues 
involved in strong evaluations that autonomy is pertinent to us. 
 An autonomous person may make strong evaluations about the 
motivations behind his acts. He can do so because he has a vocabulary of worth. 
For him, it is not only a matter of which motivations are stronger, it also matters 
which motivations are worth having.35 Taylor points out that we value the 
freedom embodied in autonomy because we prize self-realization and we prize 
self-realization because we are “purposive beings”36. We are purposive because 
we are beings for whom the nature of our existence matter in light of specific 
notions that are significant to us. 
 To put it another way, we experience our existence as a life that 
expresses what we recognize to be significant. Only those for whom the nature of 
their existence matters to them employ a vocabulary of worth in framing 
alternatives available in choices that affect who they are and how they live. We 
                                                 
35 In the same essay cited, Taylor does state in a footnote that strong evaluations need not be 
ethical, “they can also be of aesthetic or other kinds as well.” (p.24) 
36 Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty?” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 
Philosophical papers 2, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 219. 
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frame alternatives in light of what is significant to us when making strong 
evaluations, because these alternatives are seen in the light of our notions of 
“who I want to be” or “how should I live”. Our ‘purposive-ness’ is embodied in our 
acts of strong evaluation where we frame alternatives in terms of worth. Our 
autonomy-relevant second order volitions (what we want as our effective first 
order motivation) express the preferences that arise from strong evaluation. And 
it is precisely for beings who care about the shape that their lives take, that 
autonomy (self-determination) is pertinent.  
Now we can see why strong evaluations themselves do not need 
endorsement at a higher level and why they are in a sense “privileged” over first 
order motivations: though we experience both first order motivations and second 
order volitions as belonging to us, second order volitions are ours in the sense 
that they are expressive of what we want to be or how we want to live, so we can 
say that our lives are shaped by us only if they are fulfilled. Whereas first order 
motivations are ours in a different sense, they do not necessarily reflect our 
nature as purposive beings.  
This leaves the question of whether strong evaluations rely on some other 
type of motivational structure that is inherently different and on a higher level 
than the first order motivations that are occurently at work and if so, whether that 
would lead us back to the regress problem. But the motivational structure that we 
rely on in strong evaluations is neither of a different type nor is it inherently on 
some higher level than those being evaluated. We do not reflect on our entire 
motivational structure at the same time. Rather, reflection is done in a piecemeal 
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manner- critical reflection on the occurrent motivations (first order motivation) 
involves evaluating one part while holding the rest of one’s motivational structure 
fixed, and it is this fixed part that is employed in our strong evaluations. In other 
words, even though our values, beliefs, attitudes, and desires are at work at both 
the levels of first order motivation and second order volition, and there are no 
inherent differences between them, the values, beliefs, and attitudes that are 
embodied as second order volitions are nevertheless expressive of our “answers” 
to the question of “who I want to be” in light of what is significant to us and first 
order motivations do not. Of course these values, beliefs, attitudes, and desires 
that we hold in place at a particular point in time can in turn be the object of 
evaluation on another occasion.  
It has been objected that hierarchical accounts of autonomy, in being 
concerned only that the individual endorse the motivations that are currently at 
work, overlook the fact that endorsement as spelled out in hierarchical accounts 
are also displayed by victims of coercive processes such as indoctrination and 
brainwashing. Historical accounts have been raised in order to make up for the 
insufficiency of hierarchical accounts.37  Hierarchical accounts are insufficient 
because they do not rule out as non-autonomous victims of obvious “autonomy-
thwarting” processes of indoctrination. In fact, the most successful indoctrination 
processes are those that act not only on first order motivation but also on second 
order volition resulting in a seamless concurrence between their victims’ second 
order volitions and first order motivations. Their victims actually identify with and 
fully endorse the indoctrinated first order motivations without experiencing any 
                                                 
37 Mackenzie and Stoljar, op. cit.,  15. 
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dissonance within themselves. Historical accounts locate the “insufficiency” in the 
lack of attention paid to the formation of the values, attitudes, and beliefs that 
lead to the second order volition in question. And historical accounts aim to spell 
out the additional criteria needed in that area for a sufficient conception of 
autonomy.  
According to historical accounts of autonomy, not only must the individual 
critically reflect on his current motivations to ensure that they are endorsed with 
the relevant second order volition, the processes by which he acquired the 
second order volition must have also been endorsed by him. Different historical 
accounts give different conditions for what it means to endorse the process of 
acquisition. On some accounts, there must be an absence of “illegitimate 
external influences” and the motivations must not have been imposed on the 
individual via coercive procedures such as indoctrination or brainwashing. On 
other accounts, they can be considered to have been endorsed by the individual 
if he would not reject them should he be made aware of them38.  
 One objection that has been leveled at historical accounts of autonomy is 
that they are too strong. Most people do not have the high level of self 
awareness or self understanding that such accounts demand, and it is simply 
unrealistic to expect that people generally can or do evaluate all the processes 
by which their motivational structures come about and consciously either reject or 
embrace them. With such a strong condition, almost all of us will not be counted 
as autonomous since we are not constantly introspecting and evaluating. But it is 
                                                 
38 These various historical conditions that have been suggested by Gerald Dworkin and John 




not true that historical conditions imply unrealistically high levels of self 
awareness or self understanding. The counterfactual conditions such as the one 
laid down by John Christman only require that the individual not resist the 
development of the desire, value, attitude or belief should he be aware of it, or 
that the individual would not resist it if he did indeed reflect on it afterwards. But 
what if the individual never becomes aware of the processes by which some 
parts of his motivational structures or ends have come about? Can he be said to 
endorse something that he is not aware of? Do we consider him autonomous or 
not autonomous with regards to them?  
In response, it can be pointed out that we are not as opaque to ourselves 
as the objectors claim. When we think about some issue, we do not simply direct 
our attention to the issue. We are often also made aware of our values, beliefs, 
and attitudes with respect to the issue, when we attempt to muster an authentic 
and independent response to it. Besides it is not that we are aware of the content 
of our motivational structures or ends only when we are critically evaluating a 
specific issue: our values, beliefs, attitudes, desires, and ends are often brought 
to mind when they are challenged or addressed by others. It is true that we are 
transparent to ourselves to varying degrees but the conditions laid out in 
historical accounts do not demand that the individual be aware of every part of 
his motivational structure all at once. Admittedly, this does not rule out the 
possibility that he may never ever be aware of a particular element of his 
motivational structure, hence the problem whether he can be said to be 
autonomous with regards to it can still remain. But to address this problem, we 
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only need to realize that autonomy is also a matter of degree rather than an all or 
nothing property. So even though the individual may never be aware of every 
single motivation at work in him, he may still be made aware of most of it in the 
course of his life. Someone who is less self aware or less inclined to critically 
reflect on the motivational element he is made aware of, is to that extent ess 
autonomous than one who is more self aware and more inclined to critically 
reflect. The demand that the individual be completely self-transparent is indeed 
too strong and unrealistic, but historical conditions do not actually make this 
demand.  
 A second objection is that the counterfactual condition is ineffective in 
ruling out people who have been thoroughly socialized; a thoroughly socialized 
person will “pass” the counterfactual test for autonomy. This is because a person 
who has been thoroughly socialized will not reject the socialization process even 
when being informed of the autonomy thwarting nature of the process. On the 
other hand, only an already autonomous person will have the propensity and 
capability to reject any oppressive socialization process in the first place. This 
objection relies on the assumption that the concept of autonomy is in conflict with 
the idea of a socialized person and the extent to which a person is autonomous 
is directly proportionate to the extent to which he manages to “escape” from the 
influence of socialization. Linda Barclay’s response to such an objection has 
been presented in the above section. As Barclay has shown, the claim that the 
more autonomous a person is, the less he must be affected by his socialization 
process is based on the misunderstanding that the autonomous individual’s acts 
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and decisions must be totally uncaused. However, autonomy simply calls for the 
person to act from the commitments that he has taken upon himself. Even 
though the content of these commitments is not generated by the individual but 
has its source in what is external to the individual, the commitments can be said 
to be his in the way that qualifies him to be autonomous with respect to them if 
he is able to respond to them in the proper manner. A proper response must be, 
roughly speaking, one that embodies the individual’s participation in how the 
external influences affect her. Just as there are forms of socialization that provide 
what is necessary for the development of the individual’s autonomy, there can 
also be forms of socialization that curtail autonomy by inhibiting the individual’s 
ability to respond in the proper manner.   
Another assumption of the second objection is that individuals are nothing 
more than the sum of all the socialization processes that influence him. This 
means that it is logically impossible for him to critically reflect upon those 
processes themselves. It is plain that such an assumption is not true when we 
see that there are numerous instances where individuals reject the values, norms 
and beliefs that they grew up with. On a larger scale, uprisings and rebellions 
against unjust social or political arrangements are instances of whole groups of 
people rejecting and seeking to change the beliefs and attitudes of their society. 
Finally, if by the term “a thoroughly socialized person” what is meant is a person 
who totally endorses his socialization processes then his being thoroughly 
socialized is not incompatible with his autonomy. Autonomy requires precisely 
that the structures that are operating in a person’s decision making be in some 
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way authentic, and this at least includes the idea that the person endorses them. 
But if by the term “a thoroughly socialized person”, what is referred to is a person 
who is so indoctrinated that he cannot step outside the processes that should be 
under critical reflection, then he will not in fact be considered autonomous on any 
procedural accounts of autonomy since critical reflection requires that the 
individual imaginatively “step away” from the motivation that is under scrutiny in 
order to cast an evaluative eye on it. 
 Competency accounts of autonomy propose that autonomy just is the 
exercise of certain capacities such as those proposed by Diana Meyers: self-
discovery, self-direction, and self-definition. According to Meyers, hierarchical 
accounts picture autonomy as a process involving a “formal reasoning pattern”39 
performed by an already established authentic self. Meyers suggests that 
conceiving autonomy as “improvisational orchestration…(where) the authentic 
self is nothing but the evolving collocation of attributes - analogous to a musical 
ensemble’s sound - that issues from ongoing exercise of this repertory of skills”40 
will be more apt. The authentic self is the self that results as the individual 
grapples with his many identities, shaping, rejecting, or embracing them through 
self-discovery, self-direction, and self-definition.  
 However, competency accounts have to implicitly include the kind of 
endorsement proposed in historical and hierarchical accounts in order to make 
sense. For instance, upon being made reflectively aware of a certain worldview 
that has been ingrained in him throughout his upbringing (self-discovery), the 
                                                 
39 Diana Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self,” in Relational Autonomy, (New 




individual cannot be said to have appropriated it in his self-direction and self-
definition without having endorsed it in the ways suggested in historical and 
hierarchical accounts. On the other hand, competency accounts also explicitly 
spell out just what is constituted by the process (of endorsing first order 
motivations by second order volitions) explained in hierarchical and historical 
accounts of autonomy. In doing so, competency accounts highlight the fact that 
autonomy is more than just a description of a characteristic of the person or his 
act at a point in time. They also involve the notion of capacities (that can be 
developed or stunted to varying degrees) that are exercised over the course of a 
person’s life. A more robust conception of autonomy emerges together with the 
possibility of more rigorous criteria for gauging the absence or presence of 
autonomy.  
Each type of account actually emphasizes a different facet of autonomy 
and they can be taken as complementary, their claim to sufficiency not 
withstanding. We can see this when we consider what each account emphasizes 
and what it fails to emphasize in light of each other. As mentioned above, 
hierarchical accounts are concerned only about whether the motivations that are 
currently in play are authentic and thus do not adequately draw out the temporal 
dimension of autonomy. Hierarchical accounts neglect to address the possibility 
that someone’s endorsement of the occurrent motivations may be a result of 
indoctrination or other illegitimate means. Whereas historical accounts highlight 
the possibility that the individual’s accruing second order motivational volition 
could have been a result of “autonomy-thwarting” processes, competency 
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accounts are useful in showing how such processes actually do so by blunting 
specific capacities that constitute autonomous living. Moreover, while 
competency accounts which paint the person’s autonomy as an ongoing process, 
hierarchical accounts and historical accounts cannot be relied upon to provide a 
framework that allows us to see how one’s disposition for autonomy (involving 
the presence of certain capabilities), as opposed to his occurrent autonomy may 
be social41. But it is also clear that hierarchical accounts bring to the fore the 
occurent processes of endorsement that are presupposed in competency 
accounts. 
As argued by Barclay, the authentic individual is not something that is 
buried under all the socialization waiting to be released. Rather, the authentic self 
is continually shaped and re-shaped throughout the individual’s life as he 
critically reflects, endorses and rejects, and appropriates the different ‘inputs’ 
from around him. Competency accounts, in stressing the capacities involved in 
autonomy that are developed and exercised continually, capture this notion of the 
authentic individual as not a fixed entity but as what emerges in the ongoing 
effort of an individual to shape self. 
 Even though each type of account implies the insufficiency of the others, 
it does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. So long as we do not assert 
that hierarchical accounts paint a sufficient picture of autonomy, accepting the 
claims made by the hierarchical accounts that autonomy consists of freedom of 
the will does not commit us to rejecting the claims of historical accounts which 
                                                 
41 And it will be shown in chapter three that the importance of autonomy in its occurrent sense 
supervenes on the importance of autonomy in the global sense. 
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say that the person’s autonomy can be curtailed by illegitimate processes of 
motivation-acquisition. We are also not committed to rejecting the claims of 
competency accounts which say that autonomy is the exercise of several 
competencies. Similarly, as long as historical accounts are not taken to be 
sufficient, accepting that illegitimate processes of motivation-acquisition can lead 
to non-autonomous acts does not commit us to deny that autonomous act must 
proceed from a free will (where the effective will flows from the second-order 
volitions), or that autonomy involves a myriad of competencies that are exercised 
continuously throughout one’s life. In fact, as shown above, the three accounts 
are complementary precisely because each stresses a different facet of the 
autonomous life: occurrent autonomy (hierarchical accounts), acquisition of 
notions of significance (historical accounts), and the ongoing and “exercise” 
nature of autonomy (competency accounts). 
Only by looking at autonomy in the various aspects that are implicit in all 
the accounts will we have an adequate platform for a comprehensive 
examination of the ways in which autonomy is relational. I wish to suggest that 
there are four different aspects of autonomy that are implied in the three types of 
procedural theories above. These are: the evaluative tools that we use in the 
exercise of autonomy, the capacities that are involved, translating one’s 
autonomous commitments into actual living, and autonomy as a general 
disposition.  
Our motivational structure consists of our values, beliefs, attitudes and 
desires and these are also the ‘tools’ with which we use in our evaluation and 
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deliberation. It is with the values, beliefs, attitudes and desires that are “held 
fixed” at the particular occasion of critical reflection that we evaluate, weigh, and 
deliberate about the issues in question, and after which we identify with it 
wholesale, identify with some form of it, reject it, or make some changes in our 
existing motivational structure.  
As stressed in competency accounts and implied in hierarchical and 
historical accounts, critical reflection involves the exercise of certain capacities by 
the individual. Both procedural and substantive theories posit that autonomy 
involves some form of critical reflection that leads to an authentic and 
independent response by the individual that comes through some activity on his 
part. That is, the notion of autonomy necessarily entails that the individual is 
doing something and to do something is always to exercise certain capacities or 
abilities.  
The next aspect, translating one’s autonomous commitments into the 
living out of one’s life, is an aspect of autonomy in the obvious sense that without 
it, the individual’s efforts of shaping his life falls short of being effective. While he 
may be said to be autonomous in that he satisfies all the internal conditions of 
autonomy we will also say that his autonomy has been frustrated in some way. It 
is usually in this sense that we say that individuals in oppressive or totalitarian 
environments are not autonomous, since the motivations that compel them to act 
are from others and not endorsed by them in a way that signals identification on 
the level of their second order volitions.  
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The dispositional aspect of autonomy is indicated in competency theories; 
since autonomy is the process of expressing our notions of what are significant to 
us (even these notions are subject to constant modifications) in our commitments 
and in particular situations throughout our lives, the autonomous individual is one 
who continually exercises certain capacities in shaping his life. This aspect 
captures autonomy as an ongoing process and effort on the part of the individual, 
that autonomy that matters to us is of a ‘global’ nature rather than just of the 
occurrent type.      
Global and occurrent autonomy 
 Finally, I will briefly distinguish between two ways in which autonomy may 
be said to be global. This distinction will prove useful for the next section as the 
different senses of global autonomy is relational in different ways. Robert Young 
distinguishes between global autonomy and occurrent autonomy in “Autonomy 
and Socialization”: 
…the occurrent sense of autonomy, (is) the sense intended when we talk of people acting 
autonomously in particular situations. There is a further employment of the term to which we 
resort when we wish to make a more global or dispositional point about a person’s life. In this 
richer sense the self-directedness of someone’s life is exemplified by the fact that in the 
broad it is ordered according to a plan or conception which fully expresses his or her own 
will.42   
In pointing out that people may act autonomously in particular situations as 
opposed to having a disposition to act autonomously, Young’s global-occurrent 
distinction refers to autonomy as a tendency that a person may have over time 
                                                 




as opposed to autonomy that is displayed  at a point in time. An individual may 
display self-determination at a point in time, and fail to be autonomous at some 
other point in time. It may be that the individual experiences an episode of 
anomie, or fear, and gives in to the first order desires/motivations that he would 
rather not have. We see this in a person who is disgusted with his own racist 
attitudes but finds himself shunning, for racist reasons, a particular colleague that 
he meets at the shopping mall. However, even though he may not always be 
occurrently autonomous, he may still have global autonomy if his first order 
motivations tend to be in sync with his second order volitions.  
Furthermore, by pointing out that a person may be self-directed in a “richer 
sense” when he organizes his life “according to a plan or conception which fully 
expresses his or her own will”, Young also highlights that global autonomy must 
be comprehensive in scope. Autonomy has to do with the questions of “who do I 
want to be?” or “how do I want to live my life?” The answers one gives to such 
questions have implications for the whole range of areas in life, how one works, 
relates to others, the obligations one takes on, and so on. The distinction 
between global and occurrent autonomy has bearing on the discussion in chapter 
three and will be revisited there. 
We will turn to the four aspects of autonomy in the next chapter and 
examine the ways in which they are social. To recap, the four aspects are: the 
individual’s evaluative tools which are also his motivational structure, the 
capacities relevant to autonomy, the actual assertion of his autonomous 
commitments in life, and the maintenance of his propensity for autonomy. 
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Chapter 2: Social Aspects of Autonomy  
 It has been shown in chapter one that we get a more comprehensive 
picture of autonomy when we consider hierarchical, historical, and competency 
accounts as complementary rather than competing accounts. I suggested at the 
end of the chapter that four aspects of autonomy can be seen from an analysis of 
the different accounts: Autonomy involves the individual’s motivational structure, 
his exercise of specific capacities, the actual translation of his values into life-
shaping acts, and his disposition to exercise his autonomy. This chapter will 
focus on showing how each aspect can be social with the aim of elucidating 
some of the ways in which autonomy can be said to be social. 
Motivational Structure 
 The term ‘motivational structure’ refers to the beliefs, values, attitudes, 
and desires that an individual possesses. These constitute the ‘evaluative tools’ 
with which the individual critically reflects. As noted in chapter one, our 
motivational structure work at both the levels of second order volition and first 
order motivation. While the values, attitudes, and beliefs on which the second 
order volition is based are held in place as expressive of what is significant to the 
individual, the values, attitudes, beliefs, and desires at work in the first order 
motivation are the object of autonomous critical reflection. The object of critical 
reflection is often some specific element of the individual’s motivational structure 
operating as a first order motivation. For instance, a policy-maker may have 
come to realize that he has a tendency to immediately assume the worst about 
people when he finds out that they live in a disreputable area of the city. However, 
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he also believes that policy-makers ought to make decisions based on well 
researched facts and not jump to conclusions easily, and doing otherwise will be 
unjust. Not wanting to be an unjust policy-maker, he makes up his mind to stop 
his unjustified assumptions with regards to the residents of that area. In fact, he 
becomes disgusted at himself for feeling cynical the next time he has to review a 
policy that involves the residents of that area.43 Occasions to evaluate some 
element of our motivational structure often arise in the course of life with new 
experiences that confront us with new ways of looking at things. These can also 
bring to light challenges to or conflicts within our motivational structure. Of course, 
the object of critical reflection need not always be some element of one’s 
motivational structure but can also be something external to the individual, for 
instance, commands, propositions regarding a matter of fact, assertions about 
matters of aesthetics and taste made by others, or the opinions and comments, 
or persuasions from an eager sales representative.     
 The contents of our motivational structures are largely44 shaped socially: 
our parents, teachers, or caregivers impart specific values, beliefs and attitudes 
to us during our formative years and a child’s motivational structure is also 
shaped as he observes the world around him. A child who is constantly 
encouraged to try again in spite of failure and has parents who do not fret when 
things do not go their way may grow up with a positive attitude towards failure 
                                                 
43 I am not attempting to give an account of the internal mechanisms of autonomy here, the point 
that is made here is that in the critical reflection that constitutes autonomy, some particular 
elements of one’s motivational structure may be under scrutiny while the other parts are fixed and 
are employed in the critical reflection.  
44 I say “largely” here because I do not take the view that people are “blank slates” that are filled 
out by socialization processes, but this view is compatible with the view that one’s upbringing and 
socialization does play an enormous role in shaping one’s motivational structure. 
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and a healthy self-esteem. In other words, the individual relies directly on the 
socialization process to equip him with the evaluative tools needed in critical 
reflection.  
A more fundamental way in which our motivational structures are 
developed socially may be made clearer if we consider Mowgli, the “wolf-boy” 
character in Rudyard Kipling’s The Jungle Book. Mowgli, adopted as a child by 
wolves, was raised in the jungle as a wolf cub rather than as a human child. He is 
brought up in the ways of the jungle and is completely ignorant of life as a human 
being among other humans. Mowgli cannot be said to be autonomous or 
heteronomous because the notion of autonomy is simply irrelevant to him. As 
noted, the issue of autonomy is relevant only to those for whom the shape of 
their existence matters. Much as the animals of the jungle, Mowgli will certainly 
care about his existence in the sense that he cares about the physical survival 
and flourishing of his pack and himself, and will weigh alternatives in light of how 
they contribute to these ends. Recall that what characterizes strong evaluations 
is the fact that such evaluations are made about alternatives that have been 
framed as being necessarily contrastive with regards to their worth, terms such 
as “noble or base”, “sublime or crass”, “kind or cruel”. But like the animals around 
him, Mowgli will not have learnt to make strong evaluations from his wolf-parents. 
Wolves, being indifferent about the shape of their existence with regards to worth, 
are not able to frame alternatives in a way that purposive beings do. 
Consequently Mowgli’s ability to frame alternatives in a manner that reflects a 
concern for the shape his life takes, will not have been developed since he has 
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never been exposed to such a way of framing situations. It is true that Mowgli, 
being human after all, may have an innate sense of purposiveness that his wolf-
parents do not. But since Mowgli has not been “taught” to see things in terms of 
worth, it remains to be seen if his innate sense of worth can be sufficiently 
developed apart from human society. Mowgli’s motivational structure will lack the 
dimension of “worthiness” that is at play in the exercise of autonomy. One can go 
so far as to say that even though Mowgli, being human, has the potential for 
autonomy, he is nevertheless indifferent towards his own autonomy and he has 
neither developed the disposition nor the capacities for it. 
 The content of our motivational structure is not only shaped by social 
processes but it is also shaped in social processes. We form values, beliefs, 
attitudes and desires in the course of our interaction with others. The more one is 
exposed to others, the more likely one will encounter fresh articulations of old 
experiences as well as challenges to elements of one’s motivational structure. 
Fresh articulations can be in the form of direct face-to-face contact, or in the form 
of published opinions and commentaries, and they often come in the form of 
entertainment. Fresh articulations not only challenge but they can also make 
certain elements of one’s motivational structure more salient and conspicuous to 
the individual. This occurs when fresh articulations bring them to the fore as he 
responds to these articulations and challenges. It is not only the elements that 
are placed into the spotlight that are made more salient: one’s awareness of the 
motivations that are involved in evaluating the “spotlighted” element of one’s 
motivational structure is also heightened. Fresh articulations and challenges that 
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arise in interaction with others give occasion for the individual to sharpen, defend, 
re-examine, reject, shape, or re-affirm parts of his motivational structure. Here we 
see that our motivational structures are also shaped in dialogue with others. 
The Things that Matter to Us 
 As Charles Taylor has shown in his essays “What is Human Agency?”45 
and “What is Wrong with Negative Liberty?”46, autonomy is an issue only for 
those who are able to see ways of life in terms of their worthiness or significance. 
The things that matter to us are the things that we deem significant in this way. 
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to them as our “ends” even though strictly 
speaking, our ends can include many other goals that are not pertinent to the 
shape our lives take. Our ends constitute part of our motivational structure in that 
they “move our will”, and the above claims about how our motivational structures 
are formed and shaped socially apply to our ends as well. However, a little more 
can be said about our ends in particular. 
 When we say that our ends are social, we can also mean it in the same 
sense as the claim that we are motivationally social. There are several ways in 
which we are motivationally social: 1) we are motivationally social because many 
of the things that we hold dear are relational in nature - we find that relationships 
of certain types are especially significant to us, such as that between parents and 
their children, spouses, or longstanding friendships; 2) we are also motivationally 
social because we are tied to others in ways that blur the line between our own 
interests and theirs, and we sometimes appear to subordinate our interests to 
                                                 
45 Taylor, “Human Agency and Language”, 15-44. 
46 Charles Taylor, “What is Wrong with Negative Liberty?”, 211-229. 
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theirs 3) it is also the case that some of the virtues that we deem worthy of 
cultivation are necessarily relational, for instance one cannot love, care, be 
benevolent, or be forbearing outside of a social context. The claim that we are 
motivationally social can be seen as a description of the way we are now and it 
can also be read as saying that human beings are essentially relational in some 
way since our sense of fulfillment is in part tied up with goods that are relational. 
A discussion about these two claims need not be pursued here since the present 
discussion simply aims to show how the ends that inform our autonomous 
choices are social.47    
Capacities 
 As Diana Meyers suggests, an autonomous person is a person who is 
competent in exercising certain capacities.48 These are skills that are exercised 
as the individual engages in critical reflection and endorsement. We will look at 
how the capacities for A) self-awareness, B) the ability to “imagine oneself 
otherwise”, and C) to recognize and appropriate relevant information, are 
social.49 There certainly are other capacities that are relevant to the exercise of 
autonomy and may also be affected by one’s social environment in a myriad 
ways but these specific capacities are not chosen arbitrarily. I focus on these 
                                                 
47 Of course one can raise the question whether such relational ends are worth having at all since 
they may be detrimental to the individual’s propensity to be autonomous. Besides, how do we 
know the extent that a person’s ends can be relational before it becomes pernicious to his 
autonomy? However, these questions rely on the assumption that the autonomous person must 
be primarily self-interested; an assumption that has been shown to be false above in page 16-20. 
48 Meyers, “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self” 
49 Diana Meyers came up with a similar list that includes “introspective skills”, “imaginative skills 
that enable individuals to envisage a range of self-concepts they might adopt”, “memory skills that 
enable individuals to recall relevant experiences...from their own lives…(those) that associates 
have recounted…or that they have encountered in literature or other art forms”, “communication 
skills”, “analytical and reasoning skills”, “volitional skills that enable individuals to resist pressure 
from others…and that enable them to maintain their commitment to the self-portrait that they 
genuinely consider their own”, and “interpersonal skills”. 
 
 50
capacities because they are directly relevant to the issue of whether the 
individual’s occurrent exercise of autonomy is genuine, an issue that will be taken 
up in chapter three. Also, the capacities discussed here are sensitive to 
socialization because they are either imparted socially or they are exercised in 
dialogue with others. This is not the case with some of the other capacities such 
as the ability to recall or analyze, two of the skills that have been suggested by 
Meyers.  
 A) The more detailed and comprehensive a report a person can give of 
himself, the more self-aware he shows himself to be. In exercising critical 
reflection, the individual needs to be conscious of the content of his motivational 
structure. The degree to which he is aware of his relevant beliefs, values, 
attitudes, and desires towards the object of critical reflection is a function of his 
ability to critically reflect on it precisely and decisively. Returning to our example 
involving the policymaker, if our protagonist had not been aware of his moral 
belief that policymakers should be impartial, and had he not been conscious of 
the fact that he held a particular prejudice, he would not have been able to 
alienate himself from the unwanted prejudice, adjust his attitude and check his 
response towards the residents. Our unaware policymaker may experience some 
dissonance or guilt after making snide remarks about “those people who live 
there” to a colleague but he will not have been able to pinpoint the reason for the 
dissonance, much less to act in a manner that is appropriate to the kind of 
person that he wants to be, one committed to justice and impartiality. Our critical 
reflection may sometimes be directed at parts of our motivational structure and at 
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other times, be directed at some assertions or propositions that are made by 
others.50 And self-awareness with regards to one’s motivational structure is 
crucial to both types of reflection. One can muster an authentic and independent 
response to external ‘inputs’ only if one is first aware of the relevance of the input 
to one’s life and where one stands (that is, one’s first order motivations and 
second order volitions) in regard to it.  It is this awareness of one’s “inner-life” 
that most people have in mind when they talk about being introspective. 
Self-awareness comes about as one engages with others in a number of 
ways. It can result from direct feedback from others. This is a crucial source of 
self-awareness in two ways. First, to be self-aware is to know oneself in the third 
person perspective and this perspective entails a stepping away to see oneself 
from the outside51. However, we are not always able to take such a perspective 
on ourselves. In fact, someone who is perpetually ‘looking at himself from the 
outside’ is someone we might consider pathologically self-alienated. A lot of our 
self-knowledge comes from feedback from other people, be it from intimate 
others, colleagues or associates, and from interpreting the ways others respond 
to us. We sometimes autonomously reject the feedback of others, or reject a 
socially shared understanding of our identity and seek to change that 
understanding. Nevertheless the point remains that we start off with the socially 
                                                 
50 I use the terms “assertions” and “propositions” loosely here to refer to the myriad of things 
external to the individual that he may critically reflect upon- lifestyles, alternative articulations, 
opinions, commands, rhetoric, truth claims, value claims, expectations of him, and how others 
view him.  
51 Knowing is always a directed endeavour and being self-aware is to know oneself, hence I am 
not sure what it means to know oneself from a truly first person perspective. But I do not deny 
that the way we come to know ourselves is different from the way we know others or the way in 




shared terms. In the course of a person’s life, motivations that he has hitherto 
been unaware of come into play as he responds to others. He gets the 
opportunity to be made aware of these motivations when he articulates them in 
his responses. This awareness may also come about when one recognizes 
oneself in others; it is precisely this recognition that satirists count on in their 
works.  
As mentioned, self-awareness implies an adoption of the third person 
perspective. The tendency to adopt such a perspective is developed and 
encouraged to varying degrees depending on how often one has been asked to 
take such a perspective. One may be asked to take such a perspective in 
multiple ways – for instance, being asked to justify oneself, or to articulate “what 
goes on inside”. It may also be inculcated to different degrees in different cultures. 
A culture that prizes expression (in storytelling, poetry, or the arts) in first person 
narrative will have members who are more wont to be introspective than those in 
a culture that uses less of this technique. Since first person narration requires the 
protagonist to report on himself, which in turn requires him to look at himself from 
the second-person perspective.  
Secondly, recall that a significant portion of our identities is socially 
constituted - we understand ourselves in terms of our relationships to others and 
in terms of our memberships in certain groups. For instance, we are someone’s 
daughter, friend, sibling, employer, citizen of a particular country, member of 
particular ethnic group, race, class, clubs, alumni of particular schools, and so on. 
The specific shapes that the components of our identity take are influenced by 
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the socially shared and constructed understanding of them. We see an example 
of this in how specific notions of what is entailed by “being a daughter” is spelled 
out by the community. On top of that, the way individuals “fill in” each one of his 
relational identities is also influenced by the dynamic among the parties involved. 
This is because relationships, being something that is between persons, are built 
on terms that are created dialogically as those involved interact with each other. 
This indicates the second way in which the feedback of others constitutes our 
self-awareness - we articulate our self-understanding in terms that are socially 
constructed. This is not of course to say that the question of how the identity 
ought to be understood is socially determined, only that the individual’s 
understanding of a relational role is one that is shaped in society with others. 
 B) The capacity to imagine himself as being otherwise than he is, is crucial 
to the individual’s autonomy. It is this ability to conceive of oneself as being other 
than the way one already is that is employed as we critically evaluate alternatives 
in the process of endorsing or rejecting them for ourselves. We do not imagine 
ourselves with representations that are entirely new and conjured from nothing. 
As Catriona Mackenzie points out, “the repertoire on which we draw in our 
imaginary self-representations is mediated by the available cultural repertoire of 
images and representations.”52 Not only is the range of possible representations 
delimited by the cultural resources available to us, how we view these 
representations are also colored by our socially shared understanding of the 
representations. An illustration of how the range of possible representations can 
                                                 
52 Catriona Mackenzie, “Imagining Oneself Otherwise,” in Relational Autonomy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 143. 
 
 54
be delimited by one’s cultural imaginative resources can be found in the following 
account of the Pirahã tribe in Brazil. It has been reported by linguistic 
anthropologist Daniel Everett53  that subordinate clauses are not found in the 
language of this tribe. They also do not have a sophisticated concept of numbers 
as seen in the fact that they have no terms for numerals. Furthermore, 
temporality does not seem to feature in their language, and the past is a concept 
that appears to barely register in their consciousness. Consistent with the lack of 
reference to time in their articulations, the Pirahã tribe does not have any 
creation stories and they believe that “everything is the same, things always are”, 
moreover most of them do not remember the names of all four grandparents.54  
Assuming that they have the same indifference55 toward the future as they 
have for the past, an autonomous member of the tribe who has not been 
exposed to any other cultures will not be able to imagine his present alternatives 
as constituting a part of a life project that spans past, present and future. He will 
not conceive of his alternatives and choices among them as having any bearing 
on a projected self, instead they are for the here and the now. His views about 
the alternative representations are also colored by the socially shared notion of 
time in that he may not see the failure or success of making the right choice with 
as much gravity as another person who conceives her choice as part of a larger 
project. As illustrated in the account of the Pirahã tribe, the resource with which 
                                                 
53 Rafaela von Bredow, “Living Without Numbers or Time,” Spiegel Magazine, May 3, 2006, 
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,414291,00.html (accessed May 5, 
2006) 
54 Ibid. 
55 I use the term “indifference” rather than one like “unawareness” because I do not think it is the 
case nor is it the assertion of Everett that the people of this tribe do not have a sense of time, it 
seems ludicrous to say so especially since we sense that our experience of our existence is 
woven with time.  
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we imagine alternatives is a socially shared one. The shapes that our imagined 
alternatives take and how we view these imagined alternatives are affected by 
the collective understanding that we have access to. We will see in chapter three 
why and how a stagnant cultural imaginative repertoire can be detrimental to 
autonomy.  
 The preceding discussion of the Pirahã tribe illustrates the effects of a 
limited range of available cultural imagery on the present range of alternative 
representations that the individual can possibly recognize. We now turn to a 
discussion that illustrates its long-term effects on the individual’s autonomy. 
Mackenzie points out that cultural “representations can act like compulsions to 
constrain the imagination, enforce habitual patterns of thought, and stymie self-
understanding and self-definition.”56 Such compulsions bring to mind the 
processes involved in the perpetuation of propaganda- the intense and 
systematic exposure of the favored imagery or ideology that is accompanied by a 
jostling out of alternatives- intended to influence opinions and worldviews. Some 
particular set of representations may be reinforced as the society repeatedly 
employs them to the exclusion of other possible representations. As a result, the 
society as a whole, and the individual, may have increasing difficulty in 
extricating itself/himself from the habit of employing the reinforced motifs, serving 
to further root the norm, and decreasing the ability to imagine alternative 
representations. 
A culture that is insecure towards new articulations or suspicious and 
uncomfortable at dealing with conflicting representations tends to be hostile 
                                                 
56 Mackenzie, op. cit., 143. 
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towards other possible representations and those who suggest them. The 
silencing of other possible representations and the saturation of the environment 
(epistemological, normative, etc.) with some particular set of representations 
shrivels the individual’s ability to represent alternatives to himself by 
circumscribing the variety of alternatives that he can readily call to mind. 
On the other hand, societies that encourage the production of fresh 
imageries give space to the individual to exercise his imagination in terms by for 
the articulation of possible alternatives to the status quo. Such societies also give 
space for imagining oneself otherwise by providing the resources for him to 
imagine himself otherwise in the form of alternatives that have been articulated 
and broadcast by others. In other words, two things result from an environment 
with an open collective repertoire. It allows for the development and articulation 
of alternatives to the prevailing norm. And in making available alternatives to the 
individual, regularly provides the individual with opportunities to imagine himself 
otherwise.   
 C) The capacity to recognize relevant new information57 and to 
appropriate them is crucial to one’s dispositional autonomy. The individual’s effort 
to shape his life is a process that is stretched across time as he goes through an 
ongoing series of evaluations and re-evaluations, identifying, rejecting, 
sharpening, and molding the contents of his motivational structure. He may have 
reason to do so in the face of challenges to his existing motivations, as he is 
faced with choices in the course of his life, as new life experiences call into 
                                                 
57 The term “information” is used loosely in this thesis to refer to input that the individual comes 
across throughout his life such as experiences, epiphanies, viewpoints, opinions, facts, 
instructions, questions, claims, feelings, and articulations. 
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question his current ways of looking at things or doing things, or when he adds 
on new identities to the confluence of his existing ones by gaining membership in 
a group he was not a part of. All these events may give rise to new information 
that is relevant to shaping his life. Such information can give occasion for the 
individual to engage in evaluation or re-evaluation for several reasons. They 
highlight conflicts between the individual’s motivations, bring to light specific parts 
of his motivational structure that he has hitherto been unaware of, or throw new 
light on existing motivations and commitments (including relationships) that lead 
the individual to rethink his current stance. A person’s sensitivity to new 
information that is relevant for him and his ability to appropriate this new 
information in shaping his life affects how proactive he can be in defining himself 
in the face of life experiences. When we think of someone who is lacking in this 
capacity, we think of a person who is also not able to see the relevance, if indeed 
there is one, of what is happening around him to his life. Such a person tends to 
go no further than the surface and responds to things at a superficial level 
relative to one who tends to see the connection to his life. 
 The social dimension of this capacity enters in a number of ways. Firstly, 
new information is usually, but not always, generated by others. New information 
comes about as we live with others, as we watch them, and as we dialogue with 
them. Related to this is the fact that the new information only becomes clearer 
and sharper and the nature of its relevance more precisely articulated in the 
course of discussing its significance with confidantes. We often find it necessary 
to “bounce our thoughts off” someone we trust or to “talk it out” with those who 
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know us well, as we work through the new information. Admittedly, this is not 
always the case. It is true that some people do not confide in others as much, but 
the self-awareness that is involved in appropriating new information in critical 
evaluation is formed in dialogue with others. One need not actually seek the 
feedback or advice of others in order to dialogue with them. A specific thought, 
comment, idea, or observation made by someone else can be recognized by the 
individual as relevant to his circumstance without other persons having 
deliberately set out to address the circumstance. The individual can very well 
weigh comments that have been overheard from or broadcast by strangers, in his 
own circumstance. 
 Secondly, much information can either be a boon or a bane to individual 
autonomy depending on whether the individual is able to discern the quality and 
relevance of the information. In order to appropriate the relevant information, the 
individual needs to be able to trust the credibility of the information. This is 
applicable to information that involves factual-claims, testimonies, or reporting. 
Being able to test the credibility of the information depends on whether the 
individual knows the “who, where, how and what” of going about it; who to ask, 
where to go for verification, how to do so, and what constitutes validity and 
credibility. This is especially pertinent now when access to information can be 
had relatively easily and when people are bombarded with both solicited and 
unsolicited information (through pop-up windows in the internet, advertisements 
through both traditional and unconventional mediums, opinions and 
commentaries broadcast by groups or individuals on the Internet). The more the 
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environment is conducive to the verification of information, the more the 
individual is able to appropriate information that he encounters there. 
Translating autonomous commitments in one’s engagement with the world 
 Joel Feinberg lists four constraints to autonomy: positive external 
constraints, negative external constraints, positive internal constraints, and 
negative internal constraints.58 Positive internal constraints refer to the presence 
of barriers to autonomy that are internal to the person such as physical illness, 
phobias, or habits. Negative internal constraints refer to the absence of the 
requisite capacities required for autonomy, such as self-awareness, 
communicative skills, or analytic skills. It is with both positive and negative 
external constraints that we are concerned as we look at the translation of one’s 
autonomous commitments in the shaping of one’s life, as one engages with the 
world. Positive external constraints refer to the presence of coercive or 
oppressive influences that hinder autonomy. Totalitarian governance and threat 
of harm are examples of such constraints. Negative external constraints refer to 
the absence of the resources that the individual needs in order to exercise his 
autonomy; a lack of formal education, security, or other bare necessities for life 
are negative external constraints.  
 Individuals may be deprived of the resources that are needed for 
translating their autonomous commitments to act because of certain social 
arrangements. An obvious instance of this is in the deprivation of the necessities 
of life because of corruption or unjust systems of distribution. But a social system 
                                                 
58 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (N.J.: Englewood Cliffs, 1973) 13. Quoted in Robert Young, 
“Autonomy and Socialization,” Mind, New series, Vol.89, No.356 (Oct., 1980), 567. 
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that depletes the individual’s time and energy can also chip away at autonomy in 
a more insidious and chronic manner. Individuals in a system that prizes speed 
and decisiveness and is unforgiving toward the “slow”, will not have the time to 
“step back” for the evaluation and consideration that are essential to autonomous 
endorsement59. Endorsements made within such a system may appear as 
autonomously made endorsements but cannot be considered as genuinely such.  
Second, individuals who barely make ends meet while sustaining the 
obligations that matter most to them will neither have the time nor the energy to 
involve themselves in deliberating about issues that they now consider “beyond” 
themselves by being active in civil society, or staying well-informed about these 
issues. In other words, they will retreat from self-determination in areas of their 
lives that do not seem to be of immediate concern even though the state of 
affairs in these areas will have direct and fundamental impact on their lives. We 
see this with regards to autonomy in the areas of life that require concerted effort 
of a critical number of people before voices can be heard or effective changes 
made. Very often, issues regarding moral stance, work culture, gender 
perceptions, or views about education, have direct relevance for the shape that 
the life of the individual takes but requires society-wide action. Yet the fact 
remains that humans are motivationally social in the ways enumerated in chapter 
one, we understand ourselves partly in social or relational terms, and we live in 
                                                 
59 The 2006 General Elections that was held in Singapore only included nine days for the parties 
to campaign. This seems to be true to the tendency of Singaporeans who wish to “just get over it 
so that we can move on” with more essential things. However, a longer campaign time would 
have given the parties more time to present their policy suggestions and to debate about crucial 
issues in front of the people. This will in turn give the people more time to comprehend, absorb, 
and consider the different viewpoints before casting their votes. 
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society with others. As such, it is a matter of fact that how we conduct some parts 
of our lives will be directly influenced by society-wide frameworks such as laws, 
customs, or unspoken rules. The individual’s life is entwined around the 
frameworks of his society and the degree to which he has a say in the possible 
shapes his life can take is influenced by the degree to which he participates in 
the shaping of these frameworks even if the consequence is a result of concerted 
actions of many individuals. The more influence he has on these society-wide 
frameworks, the greater the extent to which his notions of significance bear on 
the areas of his life that intertwine with these frameworks. Of course whether the 
effects are those that are intended is another question.        
The space that is given for people to assert their choices can also be 
limited due to the straightforward fact that it is not allowed by the formal or 
informal systems. I am not referring to the variety of choices here, but to the 
degree to which the system takes into account the fact that individuals have 
individual preferences. This refers to the degree of sensitivity of the system, or 
social environment, to individuality. We see a lesser degree of sensitivity in an 
education system that prescribes specific combination of subjects that students 
can take and in which students are not given the opportunity to tailor their 
education according to their areas of interests.60  
 An individual cannot translate his autonomous commitments into self-
direction if there is an absence of recognition of his autonomy by society. This 
recognition is expressed in the individual’s ‘visibility’ with respect to the formal 
                                                 
60 This was a common complaint about the education system in Singapore but the Ministry of 
Education has been attempting to work more flexibility into the system in recent years.  
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and informal institutions. The visibility of the individual refers to the extent to 
which the institutions register him as an agent, someone who might be affected 
by the decisions of others, and a stakeholder whose preferences matter. The 
effectiveness of the individual’s attempt to assert his commitments in living his 
life can be greatly reduced or thwarted if the institutions within which he lives are 
not responsive to his acts or voice.  
A current issue that brings this sort of recognition into the spotlight is that 
of accruing political rights to migrants and long-term residents. It is argued that 
migrants and residents ought to be given a say in policies that directly affect 
them out of respect for them as autonomous persons who have their own 
purposes. What matters is their status as fellow human beings for whom 
autonomy matters. And all other memberships such as ethnicity, race, nationality, 
gender, or class is irrelevant to the decision of whether they should have any say 
with regards to the things that impact their lives.61
Hence, pertinent to the individual’s autonomy is the degree to which 
information that is relevant to him (such as policies and legislative decisions) is 
accessible to him, the availability of avenues through which he can participate in 
the shaping of these issues that affect him, his awareness of these avenues, and 
their accessibility to him. Without  it will be practically impossible for him to 
participate in the shaping of things that influence his life. 
 Finally, external constraints can come in the form of exacting a prohibitive 
cost on pursuing one’s autonomous commitments. Oppressive societies make it 
                                                 
61 Seyla Benhabib examines this issue in detail in her book The Rights of Others. Aliens, 
Residents, and Citizens. (U.K.: Cambridge, 2004) 
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such that the individual can only raise a dissenting voice, what more live a life 
that is an effective expression of the frowned upon commitments, at extremely 
high personal costs. This is not to argue that only a society with the explicit 
commitment to allowing maximum space for individual pursuits is compatible with 
autonomy. The point here is that societies that do not give space for discussion 
and persuasion by punishing any attempt to dissent or offer alternatives, by not 
even allowing space for discussion and persuasion, undermines the effective and 
practical culmination of individual autonomous commitments. 
Continued propensity for autonomy 
 One’s disposition to exercise autonomy refers to the continued propensity 
of the individual to be autonomous. This refers to his disposition to act or make 
decisions that flow from a commitment to the things that are of significance to 
him. This disposition can be affected by social conditions in several ways. The 
disposition to be autonomous refers to a tendency to act autonomously, and to 
have a tendency to be autonomous is to be placed in a particular position that is 
partial to exercising one’s autonomy. The position of being partial to exercising 
one’s autonomy is constituted by certain psychological states such as being used 
to the need to be the agent and director of one’s acts, the self-understanding of 
one’s effectiveness as an agent, possessing a concern for the shape of one’s life, 
or being competent in specific cognitive capacities. But these psychological 
states are developed and maintained to varying degrees in the different types of 
socialization. And the process of socialization directly affects the degree to which 
an individual develops dispositional autonomy. 
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The tendency for autonomy is constituted by a sense of oneself as an 
agent whose agency is effective. First, the disposition to self-determine can be 
stunted as a result of “learned helplessness”. Learned helplessness is a state of 
seeing one’s efforts as ineffective. “Learned helplessness” is even used in 
training circus elephants. When young, the elephants are chained to a large 
anchor and are unable to break free no matter how hard they try. They are 
conditioned to think that no attempt will work and they stop trying altogether. 
Minders of mature elephants that had been trained this way need only to tie them 
to tiny and flimsy pegs in the ground because despite being strong enough to 
free themselves now, they will no longer attempt to do so.  
This tendency to stop trying and assume that trying will be of no use has 
been seen in humans as well. We will not delve into the psychological theories 
behind this phenomenon, however the relevance for us lie in how they highlight 
the connection between the individual’s environment, his assessment of his 
social environment, and the adjustment in his expectation over time. A person’s 
disposition to assert his autonomy can be diminished if he is made to think that 
any future efforts will continue to be ineffective and he begins adjusting his desire 
for self-determination. 
People who have been under oppressive regimes for extended periods of 
time may no longer wish to carry their autonomous commitments through to 
practice settling instead for just hypothetical and abstract proclamations. They 
may lose all impulse for self-direction, or even cease to think of their 
circumstances as frustrating and oppressive. Their autonomy with regards to the 
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relevant domains of their lives may slowly cease to be an issue for them. It does 
not however take an overtly oppressive environment for this to happen. The 
individual can lose his propensity for autonomy as long as he judges that his 
efforts are of no effect and he begins to get used to the situation.  
 The disposition for autonomy transpires from a need for one’s acts and 
decisions to issue out from one’s commitments to the things that are significant to 
oneself. Such a need is encouraged to varying degrees in different people. 
People who have been accustomed to having decisions made for them lose the 
impulse to “consider things for themselves” in the domain in question. Children 
who are used to simply following instructions rather than being encouraged to 
think things through or make decisions for themselves (within reasonable limits of 
course) are not only unacquainted with the evaluative processes that are 
involved in autonomy, they are also unfamiliar with the need to identify with the 
motivations behind their acts.  
This need to identify with one’s motivations and to see them as “mine” is 
developed to different extents by different kinds of socialization. Socialization 
processes that give more opportunities for children to think through their 
decisions and to “own” their decisions develop the attitude of responsibility more 
than socializations that give less of such opportunities. This sense of oneself as a 
responsible agent is developed by being treated by others as an agent that is 
capable of responsibility. Put another way it is developed as it is exercised.  
The claim here is not that children should be allowed to act as they please 
or that only socialization that encourages people to take the polemical stance is 
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compatible with autonomy. The claim here is that the disposition to be 
autonomous develops in tandem with the amount of opportunities one has had to 
exercise critical reflection about one’s motivations and the degree to which one is 
held responsible for one’s decisions and acts.  
An oft cited reason for why paternalism is unacceptable is that it not only 
indicates a failure to recognize the autonomy of the person by not treating him as 
a purposive being, it also robs the person of his occurrent autonomy in regard to 
that particular domain in life. But what has not been pointed out as often is 
paternalism’s effect on dispositional autonomy - paternalism over time erodes the 
person’s propensity to be autonomous with respect to that part of his life. It chips 
away at his global autonomy, the exercise of his self-definition over time and over 
the range of pertinent areas of his life. This is significant considering that global 
autonomy is the sense of autonomy that captures the reason why autonomy is 
important to us. More will be said about this in chapter three.  
A similar thing happens when people deem it necessary to relinquish an 
increasing amount of control in particular aspects of life or control in an 
increasing number of domains in life for reasons of practicality. This is true of 
circumstances when it has been deemed more efficient or more effective to have 
a central body organizing and controlling specific domains in life. In this as in the 
above case of paternalism, the individual no longer takes responsibility for those 
particular domains in his life. He is no longer the one who wrestles with the 
issues in these domains of his life and someone else does it for him. This lack of 
opportunity to exercise self-direction, coupled with a lack of compelling reason to 
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self-direct (meaning that the individual is generally comfortable with the situation), 
soon leads the individual to lose the expectation of self-direction in that area. 
When the individual does not expect to be self-directing with regards to that 
domain in his life, he also loses the disposition to be self-directing in that domain. 
The fact that the inclination for self-direction in specific areas is maintained only 
by being given the space and opportunity to do so has implications for the 
duration of contracts that involve giving up the reins to another. Arrangements 
that carry the implication of relinquishing control over a large extent of one’s life 
must have provisions for the individual to re-evaluate and renew his commitment 
to the arrangement with sufficient regularity.62 It also seems that the 
extensiveness of control over multiple areas of the person’s life does not matter 
but the duration for which it lasts does have bearing on autonomy. 
 Finally, one’s propensity for autonomy can diminish or increase with one’s 
assessment of the value of autonomy. Whether autonomy is valuable regardless 
of how much people value it is irrelevant to the point that I wish to make here.63 
My point is that people lose their disposition for autonomy if they deem it of no or 
negligible value in particular domains. Gerard Elfstrom points out that, “people 
may simply care less about their government’s actions if they are able to elude 
                                                 
62 We can only conclude here that so long as the individual gets to regularly re-evaluate his 
commitment to stay in such an arrangement, his disposition to exercise autonomy in that area is 
not compromised. However, it remains to be seen if such arrangements are completely 
compatible with autonomy. Philosophers such as Marina Oshana (Marina Oshana, “Personal 
Autonomy and Society,” Journal of Social Philosophy 29, no. 1 (Spring, 1998): 81-102.) have 
argued that “happy slave” arrangements involve alienating the individual’s actions from his 
reasoning process and are hence conceptually incompatible with autonomy because autonomy 
necessitates that the individual’s actions issue from his own judgments. Therefore objections like 
Oshana’s have to be met before we can conclude that arrangements involving relinquishing 
control to another can be compatible with autonomy. 
63 However, this is relevant to the gravity of the loss of autonomy with regards to the areas in 
which people no longer value their autonomy.   
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direct political control or avoid governments that dissatisfy them. Eroded ties of 
national identification will also diminish individual persons’ attachment to their 
nation…national governments decrease in importance because they have 
reduced control over what occurs within their borders…personal mobility (also) 
provides an important safety valve by opening a ready avenue of escape for 
those who are at odds with their government”.64
In the picture Elfstrom paints, people whose stakes in a nation are no 
more than instrumental and who are able to ‘vote with their feet’, become less 
interested in having a say in the shape that their nation takes. The emotional 
costs of leaving a country that one sees merely as a service provider is minimal 
and the practical costs will be minimized by leaving.  
But a larger point can be made here as well. If people end up 
understanding the notion of national identity as a relationship between clients 
and service providers who are in charge of ensuring that the client (the citizen) 
gets the resources he needs to pursue his own goals, then people’s disposition 
for political self-determination will wither. Just as customers in a free market are 
not interested in how one or another store is run so long as it offers good service 
and products they desire, people will not be interested in who governs or how a 
nation is governed so long as they are kept comfortable and get what they want. 
Social dimension of autonomy 
 We now see that autonomy can be said to be social in three ways. Some 
aspects of autonomy are 1) developed in social contexts, while 2) the extent to 
                                                 




which other aspects flourish or wither is sensitive to the social environment and 3) 
some are socially constituted.  
1) The content of our motivational structures are imparted to us during our 
developmental years, and it is continually shaped and re-shaped in dialogue with 
others. Our strong evaluations, the kind of evaluations that are relevant to issues 
about the shape we want our lives to take, involve a sense of worth and a 
language of worth that is developed socially. It is unclear whether an individual 
who has never been in contact with other human beings will have a sense of 
significance that is sufficiently developed so as to enable him to frame his 
experiences and choices in a way that expresses a concern for the questions of 
“who I am” and “how I want to live”.  
2) Capacities such as self-awareness, the ability to imagine oneself otherwise, 
and the ability to spot and appropriate relevant new information are exercised 
and sharpened in social dialogue with others. Self-awareness is enhanced as we 
engage with others - from direct feedback from others, or as we respond to 
challenges and new articulations by others. The ability to imagine oneself 
otherwise (not as mere fancy but in terms of realistic alternatives) is 
proportionate to the space allowed for alternative representations by one’s 
environment. We spot and appropriate new information for ourselves in dialogue 
with others and our ability to judge the credibility of the new information is 
determined by the extent to which our environment is conducive to the 
verification of information. The individual also relies on his socialization to equip 
him with the necessary capacities to verify credibility. Our disposition for 
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autonomy is tied in to our expectation of being autonomous in the various 
domains of our lives. And this expectation of autonomy in the various domains 
can increase or decrease with changes in the social arrangements pertaining to 
the degree of participation in each domain. Furthermore, the collective sense of 
the value of autonomy in particular domains can also alter the individual’s desire 
for autonomy in the domains in question.  
3) It is a fact that we do have ends that are socially constitutive. Some of the 
things we value are inherently relational, like specific relationships, certain virtues, 
or membership in specific groups. But there can also be a normative slant to this 
observation. It may well be that a life without the social dimension can only be a 
greatly impoverished one. This can stem from the fact that we need a social 
environment to be nurtured, or that a full human life is one that is made up of 
specific types of relationships. Either as a descriptive or normative claim, the 
point remains that some of the ends that motivate us are constitutively social. It is 
also true that our identities are socially constituted in the sense that we 
understand ourselves in terms of our membership in certain groups or in terms of 
certain relationships we are a part of. Our identities are also socially constituted 
in the sense that we frame our identities in terms of socially constructed and 
shared representations. Furthermore, the repertoire with which we represent 
ourselves otherwise is, as Linda Barclay shows, drawn from the cultural 
repertoire that we have access to and hence is a social resource.  
 Outright oppression and compulsion of which their victims are acutely 
aware are obvious instances of curtailment of autonomy. In these cases, the 
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individual’s acts are dictated by others and he feels the frustration of being 
prevented from shaping his life according to his notions of significance. A number 
of philosophers have pointed out that a more insidious form of autonomy 
curtailment can occur while leaving intact the process of endorsement between 
the person’s second order volition and effective first order motivation. Even 
though the individual himself acts from what he recognizes as significant, his act 
is not autonomous because the notions of significance from which he has acted 
are somehow not authentically his. The next chapter will first focus on giving an 
account of how this can be so before tying it with some of what has been 
discussed in this chapter about the social dimension of the aspects of autonomy. 
Chapter three will end with a brief discussion of the implications that the 




Chapter 3: Socialization and the validity of an act as an autonomous act 
 A fundamental way in which socialization can adversely affect autonomy 
has been illustrated by a number of philosophers in the course of showing that 
content-neutral procedural accounts of autonomy are insufficient. They often 
point out that oppressive socialization, leading to a loss of autonomy, can take 
place while leaving the entire process of critical reflection, as spelled out in 
procedural accounts, intact. These philosophers hold that the individual’s act 
cannot be seen as autonomous if it has proceeded from a process of critical 
reflection that, even though it is complete and functioning, has been somehow 
invalidated by oppressive socialization, or by particular beliefs held by the 
individual.65 I will attempt to offer an explanation of how the individual’s process 
of endorsement can be rendered invalid while left intact by their social 
environment. Philosophers such as Paul Benson66, Sigurdur Kristinsson67, and 
Sarah Buss68, have offered explanations in a similar vein. They locate the reason 
for the invalidity in the individual’s impaired ability to respond to reasons that are 
relevant for the individual’s motivations for action. These are reasons that he 
should include in weighing and deliberating as he forms his second order 
volitions, or as he decides which course of action to take.69 I agree that certain 
                                                 
65 I have not yet come across anyone who has explicitly used the term “validity” in their 
arguments but the implication of validity as an inssue is quite clear. 
66 Paul Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization”  
67 Kristinsson, op. cit., 257-286. 
68 Buss, op. cit., 95-121. 
69 Not all philosophers agree that the presences of second-order volitions are a necessary 
component of autonomy. Paul Benson thinks that second or higher order volitions are simply 
additional reasons for the individual to take one course of action over another. Benson, 
“Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization”, 400. 
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types of socialization can invalidate the endorsement process70 by alienating the 
individual from the relevant reasons there are to act. I will now proceed to show 
why and how the individual’s responsiveness to reasons must be current in order 
for his acts to be considered autonomous. 
 This chapter will begin by back-tracking a little to look at what the notion of 
autonomy is meant to capture. And its implications for the validity of an occurrent 
process of endorsement (occurrent autonomy) will be spelled out. After that, we 
will look at how these implications tie in with the discussion in the previous 
chapter on the social dimensions of autonomy. Finally, there will be a brief 
discussion on how the conclusions in chapters two and three relate to Benson’s 
and Kristinsson’s takes on the relationship between autonomy and one’s 
“responsiveness to reasons”, a term used by Benson that also reflects 
Kristinsson’s point.  
What the notion of autonomy is meant to capture 
 Autonomy has a peculiar relevance for beings who are concerned about 
the way they lead their lives. This concern is borne out of the fact that they see 
things in light of a background of significance, what Charles Taylor terms as a 
“horizon of significance”.71 At the same time, they also understand that these 
notions of significance have a personal bearing for them. The “horizon of 
significance” refers to the background consisting of notions of worth and 
importance that derives independently from the individual. A peculiar 
                                                 
70 I will use the term “endorsement” interchangeably with the term “critical reflection” since in 
procedural theories the kind of endorsement appropriate to autonomy just is the kind that 
emerges from the appropriate critical reflection. 
71 Charles Taylor, “Inescapable Horizons,” in The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 31-42.  
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characteristic of worth is that it compels a response on the part of the beholder, 
to acknowledge the weight it has on the relevant matters. When we say that a 
particular notion is of worth and importance, we are also saying that it deserves, 
in its own right, to be accorded weight in the things that it relates to. And in all 
consistency, a person who recognizes the worth of a notion is also 
acknowledging its worth and importance for himself. Since its worth and 
importance are of the type that derive independently of himself, and all things 
remaining the same, it has universal application. He cannot justifiably recognize 
its worth but make himself the exception to it. When the individual recognizes 
certain notions as bearing worth and importance, he is not simply an “outsider” or 
“commentator” or “spectator” to the worth of the notion. In recognizing the worth 
and importance of a notion, it becomes significant for him in that he is also 
acknowledging that it has worth for him. 
To recognize the worth and importance of a notion is not the same as 
simply acknowledging that a notion can be of significance to someone. For 
example, one may acknowledge that integrity can be a notion of worth and 
importance to someone but this is not the same as recognizing integrity as being 
of worth and importance. When the individual recognizes the worth and 
importance of integrity, the notion takes on significance for him that entails a sort 
of voluntary allegiance or commitment on his part. In instances when the notion 
of integrity is relevant, it will weigh in, among all his other notions of significance, 
on his decision on what he wants his effective first order motivation to be.  
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A person’s acts follow from his effective first order motivations. And to a 
large extent, the kind of person one is, is defined by the actions one takes and 
the motivations from which the acts flow. An individual expresses the kind of 
person he is, and at the same time he also shapes the kind of person he is, by 
his actions that reflect his motivations. Of course we do not always take the 
courses of action that reflect the kinds of persons that we generally are. 
Someone who is characterized as a kind person is one who behaves kindly, and 
can be expected to do so in most circumstances. In characterizing him this way 
we are saying that his actions often reflect motives that express the concern for 
the wellbeing of others. At times when he acts unkindly, he is seen as acting “out 
of character”. The individual may even choose to act “out of character” in order to 
show that he is not what people have characterized him to be. Instances in which 
he acts “out of character” may lead the individual to realize that he is not the kind 
of person he thought himself to be. All these illustrate the point that insofar as 
one’s actions are thought to reflect one’s motivations, they play a part in one’s 
self-definition in the kind of person one is or the way one leads one’s life.  
 The individual’s notions of significance are those that he recognizes as 
having worth and importance that bear upon his life. The individual’s concern for 
self-definition is a concern to live his life according to what is important to him. 
After all, one who is indifferent towards everything has no preferences at all. It is 
perhaps appropriate to note here that I do not claim that when an individual 
recognizes a notion of worth and importance, he will definitely articulate an 
explicit commitment to ensure that he be characterized in terms of it. My point is 
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that insofar as he encounters issues that he sees are relevant to the notion of 
significance to him, it will be important to him to act in accordance with that 
notion. After all, the expression of one’s notions of significance and one’s 
commitments to them is distinct from one’s apprehension of and commitments to 
them. It will matter to a person for whom integrity is significant, not only that he 
will act in accordance with it, but that his motivations reflect integrity. But this 
does not presume any deliberate expression of the notion or its importance on 
his part to himself or to others.  
There is no need to postulate that recognizing a notion as significant 
requires that the recognition be ever articulated by the individual to himself or to 
others.72 And the person for whom it is important to live in accordance to his 
notions of significance need not be eloquent or articulate about it. The desire to 
and process of defining oneself or one’s life according to one’s own notions of 
significance (self-definition) need not even be something that the individual is 
conscious of in vivid terms. It is often something that the individual simply does 
(similar to breathing or thinking) and of which he is barely aware unless he 
makes an effort at self-reflection in regard to it.  
                                                 
72 In his paper “Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation”, Owen Flanagan raises the objection 
that Charles Taylor’s claims about the central role played by strong evaluations in the concept of 
personhood “overstates the degree to which rich and effective identity… (is) tied to articulate self-
comprehension and evaluation.” The reason for Flanagan’s objection is that Taylor characterizes 
strong evaluation as being framed in “qualitative necessarily contrastive terms” of worth results in 
an “over intellectualized” account of personhood with a misplaced emphasis on linguistic 
competence. But it is one thing to perceive alternatives in terms of a framework of worth, and it is 
quite another to be aware of doing so and actually articulating one’s notions of significance to 
oneself. Taylor’s claim that autonomous persons frame the alternatives that are relevant to their 
bid to shape their lives in terms of worth does not however amount to the claim that they are 
acutely aware of actually doing so. That persons frame their autonomy-relevant alternatives in 
qualitative necessarily contrastive terms (‘frameworks’) does not entail that they actually express 
their notions of significance in linguistic terms. Owen Flanagan, “Identity and Strong and weak 
Evaluation,” in Identity, Character, and Morality, eds. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) , 37-65. 
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Furthermore, most people do not have a blueprint of notions of 
significance according to which they would like to define themselves. Rather, 
most people self-define as they go along in life by reflecting and expressing their 
notions of significance in the way they live. Different people are aware of or 
actually plan and articulate their desire to live according to their notions of 
significance to different degrees. But this does not mean that those who are less 
aware of or less articulate about their apprehension of notions of significance are 
any less concerned with expressing what is important to them. The concern with 
living according to one’s notions of significance translates to a concern about 
one’s effective first order motivations. One’s effective first order motivations 
transpire into action and define who one is. This preference for one’s effective 
motivation is of course represented by one’s second order volitions. Hence 
autonomy as “self-definition” and as “self-definition” captures the idea of the 
individual’s sovereignty in shaping the kind of person one is or in living one’s life 
in a way that is important to oneself. The autonomous individual’s sovereignty in 
self-definition is his unique prerogative in that no one else can make him 
recognize specific notions as significant without appealing to his reason or 
whatever mechanism one associates with the apprehension of worth. It is 
something that no other human being or group can share with him.  
The concept of autonomy is meant to capture the idea of one’s 
sovereignty in self-definition. Considering that self-definition is a lifelong process 
that involves the many important aspects of one’s life, we can now see that the 
meaningfulness of occurrent autonomy supervenes on the importance of global 
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autonomy. Being able to exercise one’s occurrent autonomy- that one’s particular 
acts are motivated by the first order motivations that have been endorsed with 
one’s second order volitions- is important to the individual precisely because it is 
important to him that he defines himself according to his notions of significance 
as expressed in his second order volitions. Every occurrent exercise of autonomy 
is significant because of its place in the individual’s bid to define himself and 
shape his own life in response to the notions of importance and worth that he 
recognizes. An exercise of occurrent autonomy instantiates an effective effort, 
one of the string of efforts that make up the continuous process of the individual’s 
self-definition. One’s liberty to exercise one’s autonomy is hence the broad liberty 
of shaping one’s life in accordance with one’s notions of significance. All the 
other liberties such as the liberties to express one’s ideas, of pursuits, of 
association, and the like, figure as constitutive of the liberty for autonomy, 
depending on the notions of significance that are relevant in the various 
situations.  
Validity of the endorsement process 
 The validity of an entire process depends on whether it actually serves the 
function or the ends that it is claimed to serve. Since the process of exercising 
one’s autonomy embodies the individual’s concern for the kind of person he is, 
the nature of the questions, “What sort of person do I want to be?” or “How do I 
want to lead my life?”, have direct implications for when a process that 
constitutes an exercise of one’s autonomy is valid. In this section, I will take a 
closer look at the nature of the questions that the process of endorsement is 
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meant to answer before proceeding to draw its various implications about a 
necessary condition for the validity of the process.   
The question, “What sort of person do I want to be?” ,and its attending 
question, “How do I want to lead my life?”, have an inherently subjective element. 
The ways in which these questions are to be answered is hence determined by 
the type of creature who is asking them. After all, the method with which we 
investigate answers to a question must be determined by the nature of the object 
of investigation. Two things about what the process of exercising one’s autonomy 
is meant to embody can be noted for their implications on its validity: a) the 
individual’s understanding of his notions of significance are abstract, and b) his 
recognition of them are general.  
 The individual’s understanding of his notions of significance is abstract 
and his recognition of them general, simply because human beings are not 
omniscient. There is no doubt that the shape a person’s life takes flows from his 
unique experiences and the knowledge that transpire from what he has seen or 
heard. However, no person can know all there is for him to know or experience 
all there is for him to experience till the end of his life. He is continually acquiring 
new knowledge and new experiences throughout his life. In other words, no 
matter how much a person thinks he knows or have gone through, there will 
always be more that he will know and go through till he breathes his last.73 An 
                                                 
73 This refers to cases involving mature and normal functioning adults. It does not include cases 
in which the experiences of the individual no longer bear on his bid to shape his life. Individuals 
whose autonomy-relevant capacities have been devastated are no longer able to exercise 
autonomy, rendering the notion of autonomy irrelevant to them. Examples of such individuals are 
those suffering from dementia. Ronald Dworkin discusses the implications of a respect for the 
autonomy of dementia patients for the way we ought to treat them. One of the points made by 
Dworkin is that dementia patients who are in the later stages of the illness no longer possess any 
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individual’s notions of significance are influenced, to a large extent, by what he 
knows and experiences. Moreover, two people can recognize the same notion of 
significance in the abstract and still shape their lives differently because of the 
difference in what they know and experience. The individual will not cease to 
self-define in accordance with his notions of significance and in light of what he 
knows and have experienced, until the end of his lifetime. What was significant to 
a person may cease to have significance for him when he experiences 
something that alters the way he understands it, or after being made aware of 
some of its implications of which he was previously unaware.  
Individuals can come to have notions of significance through experiences 
that particularly move them. Yet our perceptions of even such experiences and of 
the “lessons” we take away from them can also change with time. And such 
changes can lead to alterations in how we understand the notions of significance 
that transpired from it, with a possible consequent change in our view of the role 
it plays in our self-definition. The passing of time can lead to change by allowing 
strong emotions to subside, by either giving opportunity for the blurring or 
sharpening of the memory of it, by giving the chance for the full consequences of 
the event to play out, or simply by allowing for it to be compared with subsequent 
experiences. The conclusions that the individual may draw regarding what is 
significant from his own experiences are always amenable to changes over time. 
                                                                                                                                                 
concern for the shape their lives take. They apprehend their experiences only in very simple 
terms of pain and pleasure. Ronald Dworkin, “Life Past Reason,” in Life’s Dominion: an argument 
about abortion, euthanasia, and individual freedom. (New York: Knopf, 1993) 218-229.  In such 
cases, the experiences that have bearing on the individual’s preference for the shape his life 
takes are only those that are prior to his impairment. 
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This is inevitable for a creature who is always gaining new experiences and 
knowledge. 
While it is with regards to the individual’s recognition of a notion’s 
significance that the point about its generality is made, it is his understanding of 
these notions that can be said to be abstract. Notions of significance are held in 
abstract terms. They are abstract in the sense that the individual’s understanding 
of them starts off as inchoate and his understanding of them becomes fuller only 
with time. The individual’s understandings of his notions of significance only gain 
concrete form in the particular. Different particular situations display the different 
implications of the notions because they emphasize different facets of the notion. 
Each new particular situation presents a new concrete way of understanding the 
notion. Thus a person’s understanding of a notion of significance is always 
abstract in regard to his understanding of it in the relevant particular situations.  
An adequate understanding of a notion of significance as something that 
bears upon the decisions about how one leads one’s life must include an 
understanding of it as applied to the day-to-day, and this includes its implications 
on the day-to-day. A person’s appreciation for the worth of the aesthetic as the 
sole bearer of worth may have transpired to a desire to lead his life as an 
aesthete, but his understanding of what the aesthetic consists in, and what being 
an aesthete means, can only be made fuller as he frames actual experiences in 
aesthetic terms. As such, the more the individual faces situations in which a 
notion is relevant, the more he has a chance to apprehend all that it implies. And 
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the more he understands of its implications on the day-to-day living of life, the 
more concrete is his apprehension of its application to the shaping of his life. 
The individual’s recognition of notions of worth and importance informs the 
way he shapes his life and the person that he is. But the individual’s recognition 
of these notions of significance to his life is always general. His life is defined as 
he exercises options that lead to actions in his encounters with the day-to-day.  
And his understanding of what recognizing the significance of each notion 
requires of him takes concrete shape only through actual experiences. These 
notions must be understood as being held in general terms because of the 
application they are meant to have- they are meant to inform one’s efforts of self-
definition. Yet self-definition is really carried out on a day-to-day basis and 
through the particulars. This means that the notions are meant to be applied to 
the particular. But one’s recognition of notions of significance is always general 
relative to all the particular instances that make up one’s life because he will 
never know what the recognition demands of him in day-to-day life till he actually 
sees it in light of particular situations.  
The individual’s recognition of a notion of significance, and the attending 
commitment to shape his life according to a notion of significance, is held as just 
that- a recognition leading to a general commitment to shape his life in light of it. 
The notion only gets applied to real situations in the particular. For instance, the 
individual who recognizes the importance of trustworthiness also commits to 
keeping his word and will want to be a man of his word whenever he is faced with 
opportunities to do so. But his recognition of trustworthiness as a notion of 
 
 83
importance does not go beyond a general admission and commitment until he 
actually keeps his word even in times when it may be a hard thing to do. The 
opportunity to really treat the notion in accordance with the worth it is 
acknowledged to have arises only in the particular. Again, it must be 
acknowledged that people are self-reflective, self-conscious, or articulate to 
varying degrees. Thus this desire to act in accordance with those general notions 
of significance may be articulated when the relevant situation arises. Alternatively, 
the individual may simply “feel that it is the right thing to do”, or simply “think it is 
better” without an explicit awareness of his commitment to the notion of 
significance. In any case, in the individual’s desire to self-define in light of his 
notions of significance, the particular demands and implications that attend what 
it means to recognize these notions only emerge when these notions are 
confronted with the particular.  
Every particular relevant situation concretizes the individual’s abstract 
understanding of the notion. And his general recognition of its significance only 
actualizes in the particular when he really does factor it in his life-shaping 
decisions. It follows from this that one’s recognition of a notion of significance is 
never really a one-off event that is settled once-and-for-all. The individual is 
faced with the chance to either define himself in accordance with the notion or 
not, with every particular relevant situation that arises. Recognition of the 
importance and worth of a notion may entail that the individual is partial to act in 
accordance with it but it does not guarantee that the individual will indeed decide 
or act in favor of it when the situation actually arises. The reason for this is that it 
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may cease to be of significance to him once he realizes some of its implications 
or demands that he can only encounter in the particular.74 Because of its general 
nature, recognition of a notion as significant to oneself is hence something that 
cannot be taken as “a done deal”. A notion’s significance to oneself is up for 
affirmation or rejection with every relevant situation. If there are no opportunities 
in which the individual can particularize a notion of significance, his recognition of 
its significance is merely cursory and what he holds significant to him remains as 
some inchoate and abstract notion that has no autonomy-relevant connection to 
his life whatsoever. 
 The validity of acts as autonomous depends on the validity of the process 
of endorsement from which it stems. This process in turn depends on whether it 
actually serves its point as embodying the individual’s efforts at self-definition. 
Specifically, the validity of the process that embodies the exercise of one’s 
autonomy depends on whether the process actually reflects the non-omniscient 
individual’s efforts at self-definition according to his abstract and general notions 
of significance. I will go on to show that the validity of the process requires that 
the notions of significance that inform the individual’s second order volitions are 
not in “closed mode”.  
                                                 
74 This is aside from the possibility that the individual may perhaps decide in favor of other notions 
of significance that commit him to other courses of action and even though he may decide in 
favor of the other notions of significance, the fact remains that he would like to act in accordance 
with all the relevant notions of significance if circumstances had permitted him to do so; in fact it 
is precisely because all the relevant notions are important to him that he is torn in the first place. 
Cases where he decides against his notions of significance because of anomie, or an episode of 
willfulness, or act rashly, or had no time to think things through, do not however illustrate 
situations in which the notions have lost their significance for the individual; what characterizes 
these situations is precisely the fact that they involve instances where the individual fails to act 
according to what he would otherwise desire to move him to act. 
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But first, let me clarify whether it is the validity of the process of exercising 
occurrent autonomy or global autonomy that I refer to in what follows. Global 
autonomy refers to the individual’s sovereignty with regards to self-definition or 
the issue of how he wants to lead his life. It encompasses the totality of the entire 
scope of the person’s life and across its entire duration. Moreover, self-definition 
is not a single process, but is the result of the individual’s expression of his 
recognition of notions of significance in his day-to-day confrontations with 
particular situations. It is this process of acting from the motivations that one 
endorses in accordance with what is important to oneself in particular situations 
that is described in hierarchical accounts. Hierarchical accounts do not describe 
global but occurrent autonomy. They elucidate what it is for particular acts to be 
autonomous, locating the criteria for autonomy in the individual’s endorsement of 
particular motivations by particular second-order volitions. The individual’s 
notions of significance are employed in self-definition in particular situations by 
informing the individual’s second-order volitions. According to Frankfurt, it is 
because a person has second order volitions, a preference regarding what his 
will, his effective motivation is, that “he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking 
freedom of the will”75. A person’s will is his effective first order motivation and he 
has freedom of the will if “he is free to will what he wants to will”76. We now see 
that Frankfurt’s hierarchical account describes only the process of an exercise of 
occurrent autonomy.   
                                                 
75 Frankfurt, op. cit., 69. 
76 Ibid., 70. 
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It is with the validity of the person’s exercise of occurrent autonomy that 
we are concerned with here. But this does not mean that the validity spoken of 
here is irrelevant to global autonomy. The importance of occurrent autonomy 
supervenes on the importance of global autonomy, and global autonomy is 
effectuated through the series of exercising one’s occurrent autonomy throughout 
one’s life. One can only be considered as autonomous in the global sense if one 
has been autonomous in the occurrent sense. It is clear that a person can hardly 
be said to be shaping his life if the notions that are important to him are only 
sporadically brought to bear upon the pertinent decisions. Yet it becomes 
meaningless to speak of and be concerned with occurrent autonomy if we fail to 
look at it in the context of global autonomy. We value autonomy because it 
embodies our concern for shaping our lives according to our notions of 
significance. And it is the ability and liberty to do so that is referred to as global 
autonomy. The relationship between occurrent and global autonomy is implied in 
the fact that a large proportion of the papers concerned with elucidating the 
criteria for autonomy focuses on figuring out when an act can be considered 
autonomous and then move on from there to conclude when a person can be 
considered as autonomous. 
 Now we are poised to show why the validity of an occurrent exercise of 
autonomy requires the notions of significance that inform it must be in “open 
mode” and not in a “closed mode”.  The fact that we are not omniscient, and 
hence that our recognition of notions of significance are abstract and general, 
imply that our notions of significance must be in “open mode”. A notion of 
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significance is held in a “closed mode” if it is treated as if it has been settled 
once-and-for-all, and if it is impervious to relevant new information. In order for 
the occurrent process to be a valid embodiment of the individual’s efforts at self-
definition, it has to take both the abstract-ness of the understanding and the 
generality of the recognition of the notions into account. The individual’s 
understanding of his notions of significance can always be fuller, or his original 
understanding of the notion can change because he can always know more. With 
every autonomy-relevant particular situation in which he is confronted with new 
experiences or information, the individual can come to understand a notion of 
significance in more concrete terms- its implications, demands, and what 
constitutes it. Hence his notions of significance must be such that they can 
change with changes that occur in what he knows and experiences, thereby 
factoring in the general and abstract ways in which the notions are held. 
 The fact that our understanding and recognition of our notions of 
significance are abstract and general respectively brings with it an inherent 
element of currency. And this element of currency must be reflected in a 
conception of autonomy. Every occurrent act that contributes to the individual’s 
bid to shape his life in accordance with what is important to him is an instance of 
bringing his general commitment and abstract understanding of his notions of 
significance to bear in the particular. And just as his course of action in the 
particular situation is determined by his notions of significance, his recognition 
and understanding of these notions are also influenced by what the particular 
currently illuminates about them. The element of currency comes into play 
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because of the fact that autonomous actions result from the two-way interaction 
between the relevant notions of significance and the particular situation. 
The individual’s notion of significance is “closed” and lacks the element of 
currency if his recognition of it as a notion of worth and importance and hence of 
significance becomes nothing but mere habit. It becomes mere habit as a result 
of being treated as if it has been settled once-and-for-all and not opened to 
revision or evaluation. Habitual responses run counter to the concept of 
autonomy because of their lack of the element of currency in the individual’s 
recognition of the notions of significance that these responses are purportedly 
based on. When one’s recognition of a notion becomes a habit, the occurrent 
exercise of endorsement that it informs is nothing more than mindless 
appropriation of the notion of significance and mindless repetition. Such an 
endorsement is disconnected from any real current apprehension of the notion’s 
worth and importance, stripping the resultant act of its importance as an act that 
constitutes the individual’s active bid to shape his life.  
A habit is something that is performed in a manner that is disconnected 
from one’s reflexive-ness, and it is void of any authentic and meaningful 
investment of the agent into the act. The agent invests himself in an act as he 
engages his reflexive-ness to the relevant information by taking them into 
consideration and responding in light of them. When the individual acts at point 
T2, from a habitual adherence to a notion that was significant to him in an earlier 
point in time, T1, he cannot be said to have invested himself authentically into the 
process because he has not engaged his reflexive capacity with regards to the 
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new information found in the particular or those that have come his way between 
T1 and T2. In a way, the agent at T1 is different from the agent at T2- the agent at 
T1 has not encountered all that the agent at T2 has encountered between the two 
points in time. A self-defining act performed at T2 is only valid as a self-defining 
act if the agent at T2 (who has encountered all the new information between T1 
and T2) has invested himself into the act by engaging his reflexive-ness in regard 
to the new information and has revisited his grasp of his relevant notions of 
significance in light of it. 
At this point, one may reasonably ask, “What then does it mean to revisit 
one’s grasp of one’s relevant notions of significance in light of the new 
information that one has encountered?” There will always be new information 
that is relevant to our apprehension of the notions that are significant to us. The 
individual can only be said to have reflexively engaged these information if he 
sees them as presenting possible alternatives to his current understanding of the 
relevant notions of significance and responds accordingly. The notion may 
continue to have significance for him the way it has been, or it continues to have 
significance for him in a different way because his understanding of its worth and 
importance has changed, or it may no longer hold significance for him because 
he no longer sees its worth and importance.  
We have seen why and how it is crucial to whether an act is autonomous 
that the individual sees the new information as presenting possible alternatives to 
the status quo and takes them into consideration in his current recognition and 
understanding of a notion’s significance. We can also now see that an act may 
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not necessarily be autonomous even if the process of endorsement underlying it 
is intact in the sense that the individual acts with a freedom of his will. The act 
cannot be seen as autonomous if the notions of significance behind it are not 
current. An act must stem from a current understanding and recognition of a 
notion of significance in order to be validly considered as constitutive of a 
person’s global autonomy. In the next section, I will seek to show how the social 
self bears on this condition of autonomy. 
The social aspect of the validity of exercise of occurrent autonomy 
 The validity of an occurrent process as an autonomous process requires 
that the individual reflexively engage with the relevant new information. This 
reflexive engagement involves seeing the new information as providing a 
possible alternative to his current understanding and recognition of the notions 
involved. Now I would like to turn to the question, “Under what circumstances 
does a person fail to engage reflexively with new information?” Specifically, I 
wish to show here that insofar as the individual does not suffer from any internal 
impairments or deficiencies that we usually acknowledge to render a person as 
one for whom the concept of autonomy is not relevant, the only way in which the 
person will be found to act from notions of significance that are in “closed mode”, 
not engaging reflexively with the new information that he has encountered, will be 
when the person’s social environment is a certain way.  
 The individual’s recognition of notions of autonomy can be “closed off” by 
either external or internal conditions. “Internal conditions” that can close off the 
individual’s notions of significance are things like psychological or physical 
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impairments that lead to delusions, hallucinations, psychosis, irrational fear, or 
anything that can cause the individual to lose touch with his reason. Alternatively 
it may just be that the individual does not possess the maturity that we assume of 
those for whom autonomy is an issue. Such internal conditions lead us to render 
the individual ineligible for autonomy to be relevant to him.  External conditions 
just refer to the conditions of the person’s environment. The individual’s 
recognition can also be closed off by both external and internal conditions and 
this can be the case if 1) there is an existing internal condition and the external 
condition is an additional factor or, 2) the external social conditions have led to 
internal conditions that diminish autonomy.  
It is scenarios of the second type in which external conditions result in 
internal impairments that is of interest here.77 Such scenarios can lead to a loss 
of autonomy while leaving the process of endorsement intact. A distinction 
between two kinds of internal conditions must be made here. Internal conditions, 
like immaturity or illness, render autonomy irrelevant to the person. However, the 
form of internal impairment that results in the second type of scenario does not 
refer to any physical or developmental impairment, but impairment only of the 
individual’s processes of cognition or judgment. This brings us to Paul Benson’s 
paper “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization” 78. In his paper, Benson is 
concerned with showing that the individual’s social environment can compromise 
the validity of his entire endorsement process by affecting his ability to engage 
                                                 
77 The fact that oppressive external conditions can impede the individual’s ability to embrace and 
appropriate alternatives was pointed out to me by Professor Ten Chin Liew in his feedback to a 




his judgment. Benson argues that certain types of socialization can be 
oppressive even when they leave the individual’s ability to endorse her 
motivations intact. Such socializations oppress by systematically “limiting in well-
organized ways what sorts of reason to act persons are able to recognize.”79 
Benson holds that even upon being confronted with relevant new information, an 
individual who has been oppressively socialized in this way will continue to 
endorse his notions of significance and act according to them without weighing 
his existing notions of significance against alternatives.  
Benson illustrates his point with an example of an “eighteen –year-old 
college student who…is bright, sensitive, earnest, and active. But she is usually 
frustrated with and disapproving of herself- and sometimes disgusted by herself- 
because she wants her body to appear the way most other people she knows 
wish it to appear. She is convinced that this is a very important aim for a woman 
to have because nearly everything in her upbringing and adolescent experience 
has affirmed its value.”80  She will continue to aim for the socialized idea of what 
a woman should be, even in the face of reasons to abandon these ideals. She 
may even have “experienced various personal conflicts owing to her gender 
socialization. She may, for instance, have had to wrestle with her tendencies 
toward feminine deference in order to prove her intellectual capabilities in the 
classroom and select a challenging field of study. In doing so, she may have 
shown that she had sufficient competence at critical reflection to be able to 
                                                 
79 Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization”, 397. 
80 Ibid., 389-390.  
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appreciate the unreasonableness of some features of her gender training.”81 
Benson goes on to say, “But this is compatible with her continuing to be deprived 
of the conceptual resources and imaginative repertoire that would allow her to re-
evaluate the value she assigns to sculpting a feminine appearance. One of the 
subtle effects of oppressive systems of socialization is precisely that they can 
compartmentalize or fragment persons’ critical competence in this way.”82 
Evidently, Benson holds that the individual might be influenced by external 
sources in such a way that leads to internal impairment in some way that results 
in the individual’s inability to appropriate alternatives even when faced with them.  
We will now turn to look at how external conditions in one’s social environment 
can compromise the responsiveness to reasons in otherwise healthy, able, and 
fully-functioning adults. 
The possible scenarios that can arise when a person is confronted with 
reasons that are relevant for his notions of significance are: i) he does not realize 
the relevance because he is impaired psychologically or physically, or because 
he has not reached the appropriate level of maturity (the internal conditions 
described above); ii) he does not realize its relevance because of incidental 
reasons; iii) he is prevented from seeing the relevant reasons as relevant due to 
external conditions; iv) the individual realizes the relevance of it and evaluates 
his existing notions alongside it and responds accordingly v) he realizes the 
relevance of the alternatives and makes a resolute attempt to ignore it, and avoid 
evaluating his existing notions alongside it. I will not belabor the first and fourth 
                                                 




points but will proceed to discuss points ii, iii, and v. In point ii) the individual may 
not be at all impaired but does not recognize the relevance because he did not 
register the alternative at all due to incidental reasons such as being distracted 
by something else. In this case the issue of whether his notion of significance is 
closed off or not is irrelevant since it is as if he was not presented with the 
alternatives at all. In v) he realizes the relevance, in the sense that the alternative 
does register on his reasoning process. But he makes an effort not to weigh his 
existing notions of significance alongside it. In this case he is in effect signaling 
an indifference to self-definition according to what is significant to him since he 
maintains his indifference when he is clearly no longer justified in believing the 
existing notion to be of worth and importance in the manner that is significant to 
him.83 Hence the issue of autonomy is not relevant to him in the same way that it 
is not relevant to Frankfurt’s “wanton”, someone who is indifferent to what 
constitutes his effective motivation. That leaves iii, the scenario in which external 
causes impede his perception of relevant reasons as providing alternatives to his 
understanding or recognition of his notions of significance.   
In iii) the individual does not take the relevant reasons into consideration. 
The cause of this may be traced to the fact that he does not think of the new 
information as leading to reasons that are relevant. An individual cannot respond 
to relevant reasons if he does not first see their relevance. It will be useful here to 
                                                 
83 In his chapter “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion”, Mill argues that the justification 
necessary for accepting a particular point of view must not only include grounds that support the 
point of view but also grounds for rejecting arguments for contrary points of view. The reason Mill 
gives for this is that only when individuals have dispelled the arguments that imply the falsehood 
of their beliefs can they justifiably say that their beliefs are not false. John Stuart Mill, “Of the 




make explicit what has been implicitly assumed in this thesis thus far. There is a 
distinction between the new information that the individual encounters and 
reasons that are relevant for him. The individual is confronted with new 
information from around him. These new information, if relevant for him, translate 
to reasons that he must take into consideration in the shaping of his life only 
when he sees their relevance. An indication that he has taken these reasons into 
consideration is when he sees them as leading to alternatives to his current 
grasp of his notions of significance. Hence, socialization can compromise 
autonomy by impeding any of these processes. 
Now we can tie in what has been shown in this chapter about the validity 
of each occurrent process of self-definition with what has been shown in the 
previous chapter about the various ways in which autonomy is social. Individuals 
do not always perceive on their own that the new information is relevant to them. 
In fact, most of the time, it is because of the articulations of others who have also 
encountered similar experiences (from which the information arise) that we see 
the connection between the new information and our lives. We are also led to 
see the relevance of the new information when we are confronted with the 
viewpoints of others, their interpretations, or direct challenges. A society can thus 
systematically deprive the individual of alternatives by preventing the 
apprehension of the relevance of new information by the individual. This comes 
about when there is an active restriction of the kinds of articulations that can be 
aired, such as in highly regimented or closed-off communities.  
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As has been concluded in chapter two, aside from being developed 
socially and being socially constituted in its content, the extent to which some of 
the aspects of autonomy flourish or wither is sensitive to the social environment. 
The individual’s self-awareness, his ability to imagine himself otherwise, to spot 
and appropriate relevant new information, or to navigate the environment of 
information, are directly influenced by his social environment. We have also seen 
in this chapter that an act cannot be considered as autonomous unless the 
notions of significance that led to it are in “open mode”, meaning that the 
individual has engaged his reflexive capacity with regards to them. I would like to 
suggest that self-awareness, the ability to imagine oneself otherwise, to spot and 
appropriate relevant new information, and to navigate one’s information 
environment are the ones that are involved in the reflexive capacity that the 
individual is meant to engage.  
In order for an individual to take relevant reasons into consideration, he 
must first possess an awareness regarding his notions of significance and be 
able to recognize that the new information he has encountered in the particular or 
elsewhere does pertain to him. His ability to appropriate the relevant reason is 
his ability to take the reason into consideration with regards to his recognition 
and understanding of a notion. And to the extent that he is prevented from 
carrying out the appropriate steps to verify or investigate the new information 
presented to him, the individual is unable to consider the information in such a 
way that he might need in order to engage it reflexively, and respond. A person’s 
ability to imagine himself otherwise refers to his ability to represent alternatives to 
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himself. He does so by employing the new information that he encounters to his 
life in his imagination. The relevant reasons are constituted by the imaginative 
resources that are available in his society. Hence the range of possible relevant 
reasons he can encounter is limited by the imaginative resources available in his 
larger environment. On top of that, we have also seen that a society that stunts 
the generation of new motifs will, over time, habituate its members to the norm by 
limiting the range of alternative representations. This of course thwarts their 
ability to engage with the new information, which they encounter in their 
experiences, by representing them in a manner that is other than the status quo. 
Oppressive socialization that closes off the individual’s recognition of 
notions of significance to alternatives can thwart autonomy in another crucial way. 
When the individual’s recognition of a notion’s significance has been closed off 
for an extended period of time, the recognition can be so ingrained that the 
individual finds it hard to abandon the old notion (or ways of understanding it) 
and embrace a reasonable alternative.84 In such cases, even after the individual 
finally encounters information and reasons that he also recognizes as relevant, 
he finds himself experiencing a tension between the old and the new notions. He 
may recognize the significance of the alternative that has resulted from his 
encounter with the new information. But he cannot fully abandon the old notion 
and shape his life according to the new notion because of the degree to which he 
has been habituated to the old. His habit of acting from the old notion that he has 
been holding only in an abstract and general way still resonates in his 
                                                 
84 It was Professor Ten Chin Liew who brought to my attention the occurrence of such a 
phenomenon and pointed out its relevance to this thesis.   
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endorsement processes. This illustrates a sense in which such oppressive 
socialization can continue to impair the individual’s responsiveness to reasons. 
He is not responsive to reasons because he finds it difficult to shape his life in 
light of the alternative notion of significance even after perceiving its relevance to 
his life. I suggest that the resonance of the old notion will only decrease with 
more exposures to relevant new information that he encounters from others or in 
the relevant particular situations. His propensity to act from his new notions of 
significance rather than his old ones will increase with an increase in the 
frequency with which he acts from them. 
One’s social environment can also be such that the individual is deprived 
of opportunities to particularize his notions of significance. As argued above, 
notions of significance that have not been particularized are only understood in 
the abstract. The individual’s recognition of their significance is only general and 
cursory. The social structure can be such that it makes it very difficult for the 
individual to translate his notions of significance into his engagement with the 
world in the ways that have been spelled out in chapter two. This way, what is 
important to him is more likely to be understood abstractedly and recognized 
generally. His grasp of the notion is a superficial one and it is never brought to 
bear on the way his life is conducted. Social arrangements can also diminish the 
individual’s propensity for exercising autonomy by developing a sense of 
ineffectiveness in him that leads to a lowering of expectations resulting in 
indifference to his inability to effectuate his purposes. It does so by allowing the 
individual to be used to having things determined and defined for him rather than 
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participating in the process of determination in the things that are pertinent to his 
life. The propensity to exercise autonomy can also diminish if the value that the 
individual places in participating in the determination of pertinent areas 
decreases. All these directly reduce the number of opportunities in which the 
individual employs his notions of significance to issues that affect his life in 
crucial ways. Moreover, it is a vicious cycle. An individual with a diminished 
propensity to exercise self-determination will in turn not be inclined to 
particularize his notions of significances. It may not be a stretch to say that his 
recognition of their significance is only superficial or that a diminished propensity 
to exercise one’s autonomy can, over time, altogether result in a dulled sense of 
the significant. 
Benson’s “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization” 
As noted in the above section, Benson argued in his paper “Autonomy and 
Oppressive Socialization”, “that autonomy requires having sufficient competence 
at critical reflection to be able to detect and appreciate the reasons there are to 
act in various ways”.85 In other words, it is necessary that the individual be able 
to weigh alternatives alongside his existing recognition of a notion and its 
attending beliefs when he is faced with alternatives. It is also necessary that he 
adjust his recognition of it accordingly, especially in regards to its role as 
informing the way he leads his life.  
Benson showed in his paper that some forms of socialization can oppress 
by impeding the individual’s responsiveness to reasons. In light of all that has 
been discussed so far in this thesis, we can now see how such oppressive 
                                                 
85 Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization”, 397. 
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socializations can render the individual’s actions as non-autonomous, even when 
the individual endorses the motivations behind the acts. Some forms of 
socialization can impede the individual’s capacity to respond to reasons by 
causing the individual to hold the notions of significance in abstract or general 
ways. The individual holds particular notions in abstraction and with a general 
recognition when these notions have not been confronted with their implications 
or alternatives. Hence socialization that oppress in the manner pointed out by 
Benson does so by leading the individual to act non-autonomously by limiting the 
generation or availability of imaginative resources, thereby limiting the possibility 
of the individual’s apprehension of relevant new information. Notions are also 
said to be held in an abstract and general manner if the individual has not been 
able to apply it to the particular situations in the shaping of his life.  
Thus we see that socialization can also oppress by limiting the exposure 
of the individual to a particular notion of significance for an extended amount of 
time during which the individual becomes highly habituated in his recognition of 
its significance. In cases like this, the individual finds it hard to extricate himself 
from the ingrained tendency of acting in accordance with the old notions even if 
he finally encounters alternatives that he recognizes to be significant. He is not 
only acting from a habitual apprehension of the old notion, his recognition of the 
new notions of significance are also only held in abstract and general terms, 
having no real bearing on the shape of his life. 




 In his paper ‘The Limits of Neutrality’86, Sigurdur Kristinsson pointed out 
that content-neutral theories of autonomy are unable to account for the apparent 
lack of autonomy in the actions that result from the individual’s “overriding 
unconditional commitment to obey”87. Kristinsson characterizes an overriding 
commitment to a principle as giving preference to it over all other possible 
alternatives. And the commitment is unconditional if the principle is given 
preference in all possible circumstances. So an overriding unconditional 
commitment to obey someone is the commitment to be obedient to him 
regardless of any reasons that might point one to the alternative and in all 
possible situations. Kristinsson argues that a sufficient account of autonomy must 
exclude persons who have made overriding unconditional commitments to obey 
since such commitments are conceptually incompatible with autonomy. This is 
because they entail that the individual alienate his acts from his judgment.  
According to Kristinsson, acting from one’s judgment is characterized by 
the fact that the act stems from the individual’s own goals and the fact that his 
motivation for acting is responsive to reasons. He points out that in order for an 
act to be autonomous, the act must be motivated by a “motivation (that is) 
responsive to the agent’s relevant wants and beliefs”88, meaning that the act 
must be carried out by the individual because it has issued directly from his 
desires, goals, and beliefs. Kristinsson also holds that in order for the individual’s 
acts to count as autonomous, the act must have flowed from a “mechanism… 
                                                 
86 Kristinsson, Op. Cit. 
87 Ibid., 265-274. 
88 Kristinsson, 275. 
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(that is) at least weakly responsive to reasons”89 in the sense that the cognitive 
mechanism from which the individual acts must be open to relevant reasons to 
act or refrain from acting. And “for (a) mechanism to be weakly reasons-
responsive, there must exist a possible world in which the same type of 
mechanism operates, there are sufficient reasons to do otherwise, and S does 
otherwise”90, where S refers to the individual who has a commitment to obey the 
commands of another person. According to Kristinsson, an act must meet two 
necessary conditions in order for it to be considered as autonomous. First, the 
act must have come about because it constitutes or is a means to the individual’s 
goals where these goals must be based on the individual’s own beliefs and 
desires. Second, the mechanism process leading up to the act must be 
responsive to and hence open to the reasons there may be to act or refrain.91  
 We have concluded that the employment of notions of significance must 
be current in order for their employment to authentically reflect the individual’s bid 
at self-definition. It has also been concluded that notions of significance that are 
held in abstract and general ways cannot inform the individual’s self-defining acts 
in a current manner. Notions of significance are held in abstraction and generally 
until they are confronted with new information and brought to bear on the 
particular. The confrontation of notions of significance with new information and 
with the particular involves an engagement of the individual’s reflexive-ness. This 
engagement of his reflexive-ness is expressed in his responsiveness to reasons 
found in the new information. That is why, as Kristinsson concludes, it is 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 276. 
91 Ibid, 274-285. 
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necessary for the individual to have acted from a mechanism that is responsive 
to reasons. For responsiveness to reasons signals the active engagement of the 
individual’s reflexive-ness. The engagement of his reflexivity is in turn necessary 




 It has been argued in this thesis that a fuller picture of what is involved in 
the exercise of autonomy emerges when we consider the different emphases of 
all three types of procedural accounts of autonomy. Hierarchical accounts 
describe the process of endorsement in occurrent autonomy. In giving an 
account of autonomy as an endorsement of one’s effective first order motivation 
at the level of one’s second order volition, hierarchical accounts also highlight the 
fact that autonomy relates to notions that one recognizes as significant. Historical 
accounts draw our attention to autonomy’s temporal dimension- that the way in 
which the individual acquired his notions of significance has a bearing on 
whether the acts that proceed from these notions are significant. Competency 
theories emphasize that autonomy is the possession and exercise of capacities 
that are developed and held to various degrees of competence. The fact that 
occurrent autonomy has a temporal dimension is also implied in competency 
theories since the shape one’s life takes is the combined result of the exercise of 
all the capacities over one’s lifetime. Four aspects of autonomy were distilled 
from taking the three types of account together. These include the motivational 
structure of the individual including his ends, the capacities that constitute the 
exercise of his autonomy, employing his notions of significance in the particular 
situations of his life, and his continued propensity to exercise his autonomy. 
   Each aspect of autonomy was examined in order to find out the ways in 
which autonomy can be said to be social. Broadly speaking, autonomy is social 
in three ways. The propensity for autonomy and the capacities involved are 
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developed via socialization. The propensity to exercise autonomy and some of 
the capacities that constitute an exercise of autonomy such as self-awareness, 
imagining oneself otherwise, and verifying new information, depend on one’s 
social environment to flourish. Autonomy is the shaping of one’s life in light of the 
things that are important to one. Given the fact that we are social creatures, we 
sometimes understand ourselves in terms of our social ties and we also pursue 
inherently social goods. Hence many of the things that are important to us are 
socially constituted.  
 One’s autonomy embodies one’s bid to shape one’s life in accordance to 
the notions that one recognizes to have significance. This bid to shape one’s life 
involves the entire span of one’s life and refers to the global autonomy. Yet the 
shaping of one’s life is something that is done in the day-to-day in the particular 
situations that one faces. Self-definition is exercised as one brings one’s notions 
of significance to bear upon the particular situations one face; this refers to one’s 
occurrent autonomy. Hence I concluded that the importance of occurrent 
autonomy supervenes on the importance of autonomy in the global sense and 
global autonomy is effectuated in the exercise of occurrent autonomy.  
We are not omniscient in that we will never have all the experiences and 
relevant new information that bear upon the notions according to which we would 
like to shape our lives. I claimed that because we are not omniscient, our notions 
of significance are understood only in abstraction and our recognition of their 
significance is only of the general nature. Notions that are held in abstraction and 
in general do not authentically reflect the individual’s input into their employment 
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in the shaping of his life. One’s recognition of the notions’ significance must be 
kept current in light of all the relevant new information that one encounters from 
others and in the particular. Otherwise the employments of these notions do not 
authentically reflect the person that one is at that point in time. The individual’s 
recognition of his notions of significance must not be “taken as if it has been 
settled once-and-for-all” if they are to be kept current. Keeping them in “open 
mode” means that the individual engages his reflexivity whenever he encounters 
relevant new information and responds accordingly by re-evaluating his notions 
of significance in light of them.  
It was then pointed out that some forms of oppressive socialization can 
impede the individual’s ability to hold his notions of significance in “open mode” in 
three ways. 1) They can do so by limiting the individual’s ability to apprehend 
alternatives. This happens when the generation of alternative representations 
has been stunted by a stagnant pool of imaginative resource. Of course it can 
also come about because alternative representations to the status quo have 
been systematically shut out.  2) The individual who has been exposed to 
particular notions of significance to the exclusion of others over a considerable 
amount of time can find it extremely difficult to let go of the old notions and 
embrace the new notions when he finally encounters alternative representations 
that he recognizes as significant. He has been so habituated to act in accordance 
with the old notions that he still feels compelled to act in accordance with them. 
As a result, his grasp and recognition of the new notions are still held in 
abstraction and generality because they are not yet brought to bear on the 
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particular situations in his life. 3) Particular characteristics of one’s social 
environment can impede the translation of one’s notions of significance into life-
defining action in the particular. They may also diminish one’s propensity for 
exercising one’s autonomy. As a result, the individual ‘s notions of significance 
are seldom or never brought to the particular, he holds them only as abstract 
notions, and his commitment to shape his life in accordance with them never 
actualizes. 
Both Benson and Kristinsson hold that it is crucial to the autonomy of the 
individual that he be responsive to reasons. And hopefully, the conclusions in this 
thesis have contributed to explaining why this is so. Benson has also pointed out 
that socialization can be oppressive by systematically stunting the individual’s 
responsiveness to reasons. How this can come about have been spelled out 
after we looked at the conclusions in chapter two (the ways in which autonomy is 
social) in light of the conclusions in chapter three (what does it mean to be 
unresponsive to reasons). We see that oppressive socialization is that it is not so 
much the repeated exposure to the same notions of significance that render the 
individual as non-autonomous. It is the exclusion of alternatives or preventing 
particularization that thwart autonomy. Because excluding alternatives or lack of 
particularization leave the individual’s recognition abstract and general by 
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